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Abstract 
This paper studies a model of endogenous bank opacity. In the model, bank opacity is costly for 
society because it reduces market discipline and encourages banks to take on too much risk. This 
is true even in the absence of agency problems between banks and the ultimate bearers of the 
risk. Banks choose to be ineﬃciently opaque if the composition of a bank’s balance sheet is 
proprietary information. Strategic behavior reduces transparency and increases the risk of a 
banking crisis. The model can explain why empirically a higher degree of bank competition leads 
to increased transparency. Optimal public disclosure requirements may make banks more 
vulnerable to a run for a given investment policy, but they reduce the risk of a run through an 
improvement in market discipline. The option of public stress tests is beneﬁcial if the policy maker 
has access to public information only. This option can be harmful if the policy maker has access 
to banks’ private information. 
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1. Introduction
The risk exposure of banks is notoriously hard to judge for the public. Bank supervisors
try to address this problem through public disclosure requirements which regulate how
much information banks need to reveal about their investment behavior. Transparent
bank balance sheets are supposed to allow financial markets to discipline bank risk
taking.1 During the recent financial crisis, public information about the risk exposure
of individual banks appears to have been particularly scarce. Bank regulators in the
U.S. and in Europe responded with the publication of bank stress test results. This
information seems to have been valuable to the public.2 Former Fed Chairman Ben
Bernanke even called the 2009 U.S. Stress Test one of the critical turning points in the
financial crisis (Bernanke, 2013).
Motivated by these observations, this paper seeks to identify the market failure which
justifies the regulation of bank transparency through public disclosure requirements or
the publication of bank stress test results. Should we force banks to be more transparent
than they choose to be? The policy debate on bank transparency often sketches a
supposed trade-off between market discipline and proprietary information.3 This trade-
off has not yet been formally studied in the literature.
In the model, bank opacity is costly for society because it reduces market discipline
and encourages banks to take on too much risk. A bank has an incentive to subject itself
to market discipline through public disclosure of its asset holdings. But the bank faces
a trade-off here if it uses private information to select the composition of its balance
sheet. A bank chooses to be inefficiently opaque if disclosure of its private information
benefits its competitors at its own expense. The associated reduction in market discipline
results in an inefficiently high level of bank risk taking. This suggests that proprietary
information can simultaneously explain bank opacity and justify its reduction through
policy.
In the model described below, strategic banks try to avoid information leakage to their
competitors. A higher number of banks investing in a given market segment reduces the
importance of strategic considerations. This mechanism can rationalize the positive em-
pirical relationship between bank competition and transparency found by Jiang, Levine,
and Lin (2014). They document that the removal of regulatory impediments to bank
1Empirical evidence on bank opacity is provided by Morgan (2002) and Flannery, Kwan, and Ni-
malendran (2004, 2013) for the U.S., and by Iannotta (2006) for Europe. International regulatory
standards for public disclosure requirements are specified in Pillar 3 of Basel II (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, 2006). For the concept of market discipline, see Flannery (1998, 2001).
2A lack of transparency in the financial system is emphasized by many accounts of the financial
crisis. See French et al. (2010), or Gorton (2010). Peristiani, Morgan, and Savino (2010) and Petrella
and Resti (2013) document that bank stock prices reacted systematically to the size of the capital
shortfalls revealed by bank stress tests in the U.S. and in Europe.
3Proprietary information is private information by which a firm can obtain an economic advantage
over its competitors. For the trade-off between market discipline and proprietary information, see Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2006, Part 4.I.G, page 228), French et al. (2010, page 33), or
Bartlett (2012). The idea of such a trade-off is criticized by Chamley, Kotlikoff, and Polemarchakis
(2012).
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competition by individual states in the U.S. has improved the informational content of
banks’ financial statements.
If a bank’s private information is useful for its rivals, the composition of its balance
sheet is proprietary information. The model predicts that the supply of public informa-
tion about banks’ risk exposure is inefficiently low in this case. Increasing transparency
through public disclosure requirements (“transparency ex-ante”) affects financial stabil-
ity in two distinct ways. (1.) Opacity renders solvent and insolvent banks observationally
equivalent. If not all banks are run at the same time, none of them will. In contrast,
transparency allows to identify insolvent banks. This may increase the incidence of bank
runs for a given level of risk taking by banks.4 (2.) Transparency reduces risk taking by
banks through an improvement of market discipline. This lowers the risk of a bank run.
The publication of bank stress test results in the U.S. and in Europe at the peak of
the crisis arguably did not aim at improving market discipline. It was too late for that.
For this reason, I consider the policy maker’s option to increase transparency after a
bank’s portfolio is chosen (“transparency ex-post”). In the model, this option reduces
the incidence of bank runs if the policy maker’s decision to disclose a bank’s risk exposure
is based on public information only. If it is based on banks’ private information, a second
equilibrium appears in which “suspicious” bank creditors force the regulator to reveal
more information than she would like to. This reduces risk sharing opportunities among
banks and triggers additional bank runs.5
The paper makes an additional contribution by extending the concept of market dis-
cipline. Commonly, public information about banks’ balance sheets is deemed useful
because of a misalignment of incentives between the bank and the ultimate bearers of
the risk (depositors, creditors, shareholders, or the deposit insurance system).6 I show
that even in the absence of agency problems of any kind, bank transparency is generally
necessary to achieve efficiency. The role of public information in this model is not to
keep bank managers from acting on their own behalf, but rather to allow them to use
their portfolio choice to influence public expectations. In the absence of transparency,
banks have an incentive to deviate from the announced portfolio policy and take on too
much risk. They face a credibility problem similar to the problem of time-inconsistency
in Kydland and Prescott (1977). Bank opacity creates a credibility problem which is
absent under transparency.
This paper also differs from the existing theoretical literature because it studies trans-
4Hirshleifer (1971) provides an early example of how public information reduces risk sharing oppor-
tunities among agents.
5In practice, stress test exercises seldom trigger runs because under-capitalized banks are often
required to raise new equity. To the extent that this additional capital has an opportunity cost, these
bank re-capitalizations are socially costly.
6Incentive problems in banking are emphasized by Calomiris and Kahn (1991), and Diamond and
Rajan (2001). In these models, market discipline serves as a rationalization of demandable debt. In
my model, the financial structure of the bank is exogenous. Market discipline can be improved through
an increase in transparency. Holmstro¨m (1979) describes the central role of information in limiting
inefficiencies which arise from agency problems. For the relationship between transparency and risk
taking when incentives are misaligned, see Cordella and Yeyati (1998), Matutes and Vives (2000), and
Blum (2002).
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parency as public information about a bank’s risk exposure, that is, its portfolio choice.
This is the kind of information which matters for market discipline and which is regulated
by Pillar 3 of Basel II. In contrast, existing models of endogenous bank transparency
study public information about a bank’s realized losses (see the Related Literature sec-
tion below). In these models, bank losses are exogenous and banks do not choose the risk
of their portfolio. Obviously, these models cannot address the issue of market discipline.
In Section 2.5, I briefly show that transparency of a bank’s risk exposure may gener-
ate very different results from transparency of bank losses. One reason for the absence
of models of endogenous transparency which include banks’ portfolio choice might be
that this analysis can be technically quite challenging. Positive bank run risk implies
non-linear payoffs. In a standard portfolio problem with risk aversion, this non-linearity
complicates the analysis of the optimal portfolio choice. In a modified portfolio problem
under risk neutrality, I am able to derive an interior solution in closed-form. This makes
the analysis of transparency as public information about a bank’s risk exposure highly
tractable.
Model Assumptions
The intermediary in the model is called a bank because of a maturity mismatch between
its assets and liabilities. In particular, some part of its funding is short-term debt.
This assumption is meant to capture banks’ exposure to the risk of a sudden dry-up of
funds.7 In case a bank is unable to roll-over, it needs to liquidate some part of its assets
prematurely which reduces their value.
The structure of the model is similar to Allen and Gale (1998). Banks use investors’
funds to select a portfolio of riskless and risky projects. This portfolio choice introduces
a relationship between risk taking and transparency, which is essential for the model
to address the concept of market discipline. The fundamental uncertainty about risky
projects is resolved in an interim period before projects have actually paid off. The
analysis also shares with Allen and Gale (1998) a focus on fundamental-based bank runs
as opposed to the panic-based runs of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
A bank can acquire private information about a risky project in its neighborhood.
This local intelligence is proprietary information.8 Distance need not be an exclusively
geographical factor though. Banks might differentiate themselves from competitors by
specializing in separate types of loans. Projects are assumed to be bank-specific. This
assumption allows me to abstract from competition between banks for assets in order
7For U.S. banks, Shibut (2002) calculates that uninsured deposits account for 15 percent of overall
liabilities. This ratio is very stable across size groups. She also documents the increasing importance of
non-depository sources of credit. Beatty and Liao (2014) report that ‘noncore funding’ (which largely
consists of short-term uninsured liabilities) accounts for roughly 20 percent of U.S. bank funding. For
an empirical account of short-term funding of U.S. bank holding companies (including broker-dealers),
see Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011). An international view on bank liabilities is provided by the
IMF (2013).
8Empirical results by Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) suggest that banks’ ability to collect private
information about loan applicants declines with physical distance. For instance, a bank commits more
errors in granting credit to small businesses which are farther away.
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to focus on competition between banks for liabilities (i.e. household savings).9 I study
competition between a finite number of banks. Market power of banks seems to be
empirically relevant.10
A bank in the model decides on its level of transparency by selecting ex-ante the
probability that its portfolio choice becomes public information. In practice, a bank can
set the level of transparency by choosing the frequency and the level of detail of publicly
disclosed information about asset holdings. This disclosure becomes credible through
external auditing. Bank regulators lend some credibility as well, since they know more
about individual banks than the public. This prevents banks from reporting materially
false information.
Banks choose their desired level of transparency ex-ante when they are still perfectly
identical. If a bank could decide about disclosure after its portfolio is chosen and news
about risky projects have arrived, solvent banks could avoid bank runs by disclosing
their asset holdings. I assume that the transparency choice is made ex-ante to account
for the fact that in a crisis situation an opaque bank arguably cannot decide to become
transparent instantaneously. When bad news raise doubts about the solvency of financial
institutions, each bank tries to convince the public that its own exposure to the bad shock
is small. But it takes time to communicate this information in a credible way. Disclosed
information needs to be verified by external auditors or bank supervisors. The “quickest”
of the recent stress test exercises was the 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program
in the U.S., which took three months from the official announcement until the release of
the results.11
Bank Transparency in Practice
The empirically observed level of public disclosure by banks appears to be largely deter-
mined by regulatory minimum requirements. National regulations (such as the manda-
tory quarterly call reports in the U.S.) are harmonized and supplemented by the inter-
national Basel Accords. Pillar 3 of Basel II foresees public disclosure of bank-specific
credit risk broken down by geographical area, risk class, residual maturity, business sec-
tor, and counterparty type.12 Pillar 3 disclosures are highly aggregated and published
on a semi-annual or quarterly basis.
Banks are required to report loan loss provisions as part of their income statements.
Loan loss provisions are a source of public information about risk exposure, since they
are estimates of probable loan losses. The empirical accounting literature finds that
banks exercise a substantial amount of discretion in managing loan loss provisions.13
9The median distance between a lending bank and its small-firm customer is 4 miles in the U.S.
(Petersen and Rajan, 2002) and 1.4 miles in Belgium (Degryse and Ongena, 2005). Competition between
banks for assets is modeled by Hauswald and Marquez (2003, 2006).
10Scherer (2015) reports that the average market share of the biggest three retail banks is 61.2
percent for U.S. metropolitan areas, and 85.5 percent for rural counties.
11See Table 1 in Candelon and Sy (2015).
12Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006, Part 4.II.D.2, pp. 232-240). The implementation
of Basel II was not completed before 2008.
13See Beatty and Liao (2014).
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The publication of bank stress test results is an additional channel through which the
public learns about individual banks’ risk exposure. The impact of selected macroeco-
nomic scenarios on a bank’s equity contains information about its asset portfolio. The
level of detail of published stress test results differs across stress test exercises.14
Related Literature
A formal analysis of efficiency in the supply of public information about banks’ risk ex-
posure is practically absent. This is surprising because a sound and consistent economic
argument is needed to justify the observed regulatory interventions.
Cordella and Yeyati (1998), Matutes and Vives (2000), and Blum (2002) show that
banks take on more risk if their portfolio choice is not publicly observable. But the
level of transparency is taken as exogenous in these studies and they do not address the
question whether policy intervention is warranted. Similarly, Sato (2014) studies the
behavior of an investment fund whose portfolio is unobservable for outsiders. Again,
opacity is not a choice in this model.15
A number of contributions addresses public disclosure of bank losses. In these models,
bank performance is largely exogenous and there is no or no interesting role for the
bank’s portfolio or risk choice. Obviously, these papers cannot directly address market
discipline or the relationship between bank opacity and risk taking.
In Chen and Hasan (2006), banks decide to delay the disclosure of losses in order to
avoid efficient bank runs. Mandatory disclosure may be beneficial because it increases
the probability of a bank run. This result is in contrast to the conventional wisdom that
transparency should serve to reduce the likelihood of a banking crisis. Spargoli (2012)
offers a complementary analysis by studying costly forbearance. He shows that the
incentives of banks to hide bad loans from the public are stronger in crisis times. Alvarez
and Barlevy (2014) examine banks’ transparency choice in a network of interbank claims.
They find that mandatory disclosure of bank losses may improve upon the equilibrium
outcome because of contagion effects. Moreno and Takalo (2014) study the precision of
private signals to asymmetrically informed creditors. This notion of bank transparency
differs from the focus on public information shared by the rest of the literature.
A number of contributions stresses the social benefits of limited disclosure. Opacity
allows to pool investment risks. Liquidity insurance may be reduced if losses of invest-
ment projects become public. Examples of this mechanism are Kaplan (2006), or Dang,
14In the U.S., the 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program was the first of a series of bank
stress tests. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires the Federal Reserve to publish a summary of the
results of its yearly stress tests. The first European Union-wide stress test was conducted by the
Committee of European Banking Supervisors in 2009. Since its establishment in 2011, these tasks have
been inherited by the European Banking Authority. Bank-specific results were not published after all
exercises. See Schuermann (2014) and Candelon and Sy (2015) for a description of bank stress tests in
the U.S. and in Europe.
15Sato (2014) shows that in his model fund managers would prefer to make their portfolio choice
observable if they could. In Section 5 of his paper, he conjectures that fund managers might prefer to
hide their portfolio choice if it was proprietary information.
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Gorton, Holmstro¨m, and Ordon˜ez (2014). These results rely on the Hirshleifer effect.16
Also in Bhave (2014), investment in opaque assets insures against idiosyncratic shocks.
But it results in a bank run whenever the aggregate state is bad. Banks’ choice of
transparency is generally inefficient due to fire sales in crisis times.
Without exception, the models cited above study a bank’s incentive to hide losses
from the public. The result that a bank would like to prevent bad news about risky
projects from hitting the market is also present in the model which I describe below.
Costly bank runs imply that the cost of bad news in the interim period is higher than
the benefit of good news. The social planner would pay a price to prevent the arrival of
news in the interim period in order to exclude the possibility of a bank run.
I contribute to the literature by studying a case in which the arrival of news about
risky projects in the interim period is unavoidable and not a choice of the bank. Bad
things happen. Asset prices drop. Economic indicators reveal bad news about certain
business sectors or regions. Whenever this happens, investors would like to know if a
bank is exposed to this shock. I show that ex-ante the market may reward banks which
choose not to provide this information even if this increases the probability of a banking
crisis. In a simple example, I also discuss why the disclosure of a bank’s risk exposure is
quite different from the disclosure of losses (Section 2.5).17 This different kind of market
failure generally requires a different kind of policy intervention.
My paper also relates to two contributions which study how an intermediary can
protect its informational advantage about investment projects from free-riding by com-
petitors. In Anand and Galetovic (2000), a dynamic game between oligopolistic banks
can sustain an equilibrium without free-riding on the screening of rivals. Breton (2011)
shows that intermediaries which fund more projects than they have actually screened
can appropriate more of the value created by their screening effort. In these two contri-
butions, investment projects last for more than one period. Funding a project reveals
information about its quality to rivals which intensifies competition for projects at an
interim stage. In contrast, in my model projects require only initial funding. It is the
size of the investment in one project which reveals information about another project.
This intensifies competition among banks for funding at the initial stage and can be
counteracted by hiding the portfolio choice.
Another strand of literature studies models of stress tests and disclosure by bank
regulators. These papers do not address the question whether banks themselves might
be able to supply the efficient amount of transparency to the public. Recent examples of
this literature are Bouvard, Chaigneau, and de Motta (2014), or Goldstein and Leitner
(2015).
16Hirshleifer (1971) provides an early example of how public information reduces risk sharing oppor-
tunities among agents. See also Andolfatto and Martin (2013), Monnet and Quintin (2013), Andolfatto,
Berentsen, and Waller (2014), or Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014). The benefits of symmetric ignorance rel-
ative to the case of asymmetric information are described by Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), Jacklin
(1993), Pagano and Volpin (2012), and Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2013).
17In Dang, Gorton, Holmstro¨m, and Ordon˜ez (2014), the bank tries to hide bad news about invest-
ment projects. At the same time, the authors show in Section 3.2 of their paper that the bank has no
incentive at all to hide its portfolio choice between risky and riskless assets.
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In summary, the problem of a bank which deliberately hides its portfolio choice from
the public has not yet been formally studied. In contrast, informed trading on asset mar-
kets has been extensively analyzed building on the seminal contributions by Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) and Kyle (1985). The key difference between that literature and my
model is that a bank’s informed portfolio choice is not reflected by publicly observable
asset prices.
2. Market Discipline
This section describes the role of market discipline in a three-period model: t = 0, 1, 2.
There are many households and two banks: A and B. Transparency is measured as
the probability that a bank’s portfolio choice becomes public information. I show that
transparency affects risk taking even if the preferences of bankers and households are
perfectly aligned. In contrast to the rest of the paper, banks cannot acquire private
information about investment projects in this section.
Households. There is a representative household with endowment w. Households
are risk neutral and have a discount factor of one. They can invest their endowment in
bank equity and short-term debt.
Bank Liabilities. There are three periods: t = 0, 1, 2. At the end of period 0, bank
j has collected some quantity kj of resources from households. Some part of the bank’s
liabilities is in the form of equity and some part is in the form of short-term debt. The
quantity of equity capital q is exogenously given and identical for both banks. The
remainder of a bank’s balance sheet kj − q is financed by short-term debt. Short-term
debt needs to be rolled over in the interim period at t = 1. If short-term creditors refuse
to roll-over, their claims are served sequentially. Claims of debt holders are senior to
the claims of shareholders. The face value of short-term debt with maturity at t = 1 is
denoted by Dj.
Projects. Each bank has access to two projects: a safe and a risky one. Both projects
are started at the end of period 0. The safe project pays off a return S ≥ 1 at t = 2 with
certainty. Also the risky project pays off in t = 2. This project has a higher marginal
return R > S. The risky project is bank-specific. It is risky because the maximum
project size θj is uncertain. If the amount of resources invested in the risky project ij
by bank j is higher than θj, the surplus amount ij − θj is pure waste. Accordingly, the
gross value of bank j’s portfolio at t = 2 after the two projects have been completed is
given by:
Vj ≡ S (kj − ij) + R min{ ij , θj } .
This setup is designed to generate a non-trivial portfolio problem under risk neutrality.
The uncertain project size of the two bank-specific risky projects has one common and
one idiosyncratic component:
θj = Θ + εj , j = A,B,
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where εj is a uniform random variable with:
εj ∼ U(−a, a) , j = A,B.
The common component Θ, which affects both θA and θB, is uniform as well:
Θ = µ + η , with: η ∼ U(−b, b) .
A high value of b relative to a implies that θA and θB are strongly correlated. I consider
the case that the first best portfolio choice is always interior for all realizations of θj:
µ− a− b > 0 and µ+ a+ b < kj for j = A,B.
Bank Runs. If projects are stopped and liquidated in the interim period 1, there is
a cost. In this model, premature liquidation occurs in equilibrium only in case of a bank
run. For this case I assume a fixed cost Φ.18 The net value of the bank’s portfolio in
t = 2 is equal to Vj −1runjΦ, where 1runj is an indicator function with value one in case
of a run on bank j.
Multiple Equilibria. As in Allen and Gale (1998), I assume that if there are multiple
equilibria at the roll-over stage in t = 1, the bank is allowed to select the equilibrium
that is preferred by creditors. This means that a bank run occurs only if it is the unique
equilibrium. This assumption is made purely for analytical convenience. Alternatively,
equilibrium selection by sunspots could easily be accommodated and would not change
the key results of the paper.19
Bankers. The two bankers A and B compete for household funds in period 0. Banker
j = A,B has the following preferences:
u(cj, ij) = cj − 1ij>0 ξ ,
where cj denotes consumption by banker j and ξ is a small positive number. Bankers are
risk neutral and incur a fixed cost of exerting the effort of selecting a portfolio different
from the default choice of ij = 0. Since I assume the cost ξ to be small, compensating
banker j with a positive share τj ∈ [0, 1] of the net value of the bank’s portfolio at t = 2
is sufficient to perfectly align the banker’s and households’ preferences for the portfolio
choice. Claims of bankers are senior to the claims of households (i.e. short-term debt
and outside equity).
Information. The realization of θA and θB becomes public knowledge at t = 1 after
the two banks have chosen their portfolio but before projects have actually paid off.
Bank j’s portfolio choice ij becomes public information at the end of period 0 with
probability pij. This probability is endogenous. Bank j publicly chooses its level of
transparency pij at the beginning of period 0. If ij becomes public information at the
end of period 0, households know the exact value of Vj already in the interim period
18As Diamond and Dybvig (1983, p. 405) put it: “One interpretation of the technology is that long-
term capital investments are somewhat irreversible, which appears to be a reasonable characterization.”
19As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a lender of last resort could rule out the Pareto-inferior equi-
librium at zero cost. For models of sunspot-driven bank runs, see Cooper and Ross (1998), or Peck and
Shell (2003).
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t = 1. If ij does not become public information, households need to form a belief about
Vj based on their date 1 information set Q1.
Timing. The timing of the setup is summarized below:
t=0 Bankers A and B publicly choose transparency piA and piB and offer prices for their
services τA and τB. They collect funds from households.
The two banks select a portfolio: iA and iB. The portfolio choices iA and iB become
public information instantaneously with probability piA and piB, respectively.
t=1 All agents observe θA and θB. Creditors decide whether to roll-over the short-term
debt of the respective bank.
t=2 The payoff of projects net of liquidation costs is distributed among households and
bankers. All agents consume.
2.1. Bank Runs
Without loss of generality, I focus attention on banker A. The problem of banker B
is entirely symmetric. I solve for the equilibrium allocation by backward induction. In
period 2 all agents consume their entire wealth. The interim period at t = 1 is more
interesting. At this point, creditors choose whether to roll-over banks’ short-term debt.
They already know the realization of θA and θB, but projects have not paid off yet.
Creditors also know iA and iB if they are publicly observable.
If a creditor considers bank A’s short-term debt as riskless, she will roll-over at the
same conditions as before: a payment of DA due at t = 2. If after the observation of θA
(and possibly iA) a creditor assumes that bank A will not be able to fully serve DA in
period 2, she may demand immediate repayment in t = 1. If creditors do not roll-over,
the bank needs to prematurely liquidate some part of its projects in order to pay out
DA. Because of the costs of early liquidation Φ, roll-over is efficient.
If banker A’s portfolio choice iA is publicly observed, creditors know the exact value
of VA at t = 1 already. If iA is not observed, creditors have to form a belief about iA and
about VA conditional on their period 1 information set Q1. The bank’s portfolio choice
problem studied below has a deterministic solution. Agents have rational expectations.
It follows that even if iA is not publicly observed, creditors’ belief about iA will be a
degenerate probability distribution with mass one on a single value iˆA. The same is true
for creditors’ belief about VA which puts probability mass one on the value E[VA|Q1].
If short-term creditors believe in period 1 that the gross value of bank A’s portfolio
VA is not sufficient to cover the claims both of the banker and of creditors, a bank run
occurs as shown in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2.1. A bank run is the only Nash equilibrium if and only if: E[VA|Q1] < D˜A,
where D˜A =
DA
1−τA .
Proofs which are omitted from the body of the text can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 2.1 states a familiar result. Even though collectively short-term creditors have
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no interest in the early liquidation of projects, each creditor individually may find it
optimal not to roll-over her credit claim. In particular, this is the case if a creditor
expects that the bank will not be able to fully serve all debt claims in period 2.
Transparency
With probability piA, bank A’s portfolio choice is public information. In this case, both
iA and VA are directly observed at t = 1. Intuitively, a bank with little exposure to the
risky project (i.e. a low value of iA) should face a small risk of a bank run. This is the
case if the following condition holds:
(A0) SkA ≥ D˜A.
If condition (A0) is satisfied, an observable portfolio choice iA = 0 implies that bank A
can never face a bank run. A run can only occur if the bank has overinvested: iA > θA.
This yields the following Corollary.
Corollary 2.2. If iA is public information and condition (A0) holds, a bank run occurs
if and only if:
θA <
1
R
[SiA − (SkA − D˜A) ] .
A high value of iA increases the range of realizations of θA which trigger a bank run.
This makes a bank run more likely.
Opacity
If bank A’s portfolio choice is not public information, iA and VA are not directly ob-
servable at t = 1. In this case, short-term creditors have to rely on their beliefs iˆA and
E[VA|Q1].
Corollary 2.3. If iA is not public information and condition (A0) holds, a bank run
occurs if and only if:
θA <
1
R
[SiˆA − (SkA − D˜A) ] .
This expression makes use of the fact that creditors’ belief about iA puts a probability
mass of one on the value iˆA. In contrast to the case of an observable portfolio choice, it
is now the public’s belief about bank A’s risk exposure iˆA which matters for the risk of
a bank run. The actual value of iA is not important.
2.2. Portfolio Choice
We have seen that the bank’s actual or perceived portfolio choice can affect the risk of
a bank run. Continuing to proceed by backward induction, I study the bank’s portfolio
choice problem at the end of period 0. Bank A has collected some quantity kA from
households in order to invest it in a portfolio of a risky and a riskless project. Banker
10
A knows that with probability piA her portfolio choice iA becomes public information
instantaneously. With probability piB, banker A observes banker B’s portfolio choice
iB at the time when she chooses iA. Since in this section I assume that both bankers
have the same information about the probability distribution of θA and θB, a possible
observation of iB does not contain additional information for banker A. Therefore, it
does not affect banker A’s portfolio choice.
Banker A is compensated by a positive share of the net value of bank A’s portfolio.
She chooses iA by solving:
max
iA
τA E [VA − 1runAΦ] ,
subject to: VA = S (kA − iA) + R min{ iA , θA } ,
1runA =
{
1 , if θA <
1
R
[Sx− (SkA − D˜A) ] ,
0 , otherwise ,
x =
{
iA with probability piA ,
iˆA with probability 1− piA .
Obviously, banker A’s choice maximizes the expected net value of bank A’s portfolio.
For any τA ∈ (0, 1), the preferences of households and the banker about the optimal
portfolio choice are perfectly aligned. It is as if banker A would choose the portfolio in
order to maximize household utility. The optimal portfolio choice is described by the
following Lemma.
Lemma 2.4. The optimal portfolio choice is:
i∗A = µ − a
(
2S
R
− 1
)
− piA Φ S
R2
,
if the following conditions are jointly satisfied:
(A0) SkA ≥ D˜A ,
(A1) a > b ,
(A2) µ− a+ b < 1
R
[
S
(
µ− a
(
2S
R
− 1
)
− Φ S
R2
)
− (SkA − D˜A)
]
, and
(A3) µ− a
(
2S
R
− 1
)
< µ+ a− b .
Conditions (A1), (A2), and (A3) are new. The maximum project size θA is the sum of
the two independent uniform variables Θ and εA. Condition (A1) holds if the uncertainty
about θA is primarily driven by the idiosyncratic component εA instead of the common
component Θ. Conditions (A2) and (A3) imply that the probability density of θA is flat
both at the threshold value of θA which triggers a bank run and at the point θA = i
∗
A.
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If these conditions do not hold, the solution has a different expression which is more
cumbersome to derive. The results of the paper do not depend on the particular form of
this expression. The one important assumption used in the analysis below is that banker
A’s portfolio choice is sufficiently aggressive to allow for a bank run if iA is observed and
θA turns out to be too low.
20
The optimal portfolio choice i∗A has an interior solution even though all agents are
risk neutral. As long as θA is higher than iA, the marginal return of investment in the
risky project R is higher than the safe return S. But if θA turns out to be smaller than
iA, the marginal return of the risky project is zero. A higher choice of iA makes it more
and more likely that the maximum project size θA is smaller than iA. Accordingly, the
expected marginal return of investment in the risky project is falling in iA.
The optimal portfolio choice i∗A is increasing in the expected maximum project size µ.
An increase of uncertainty a decreases i∗A if and only if:
2S
R
≥ 1 ⇔ S ≥ R− S .
If S = R − S, investing too much in the risky project and earning zero at the margin
instead of the safe return S is just as costly as investing too little and missing out on
R−S. If S > R−S, overinvestment is more costly than underinvestment. In this case,
an increase in uncertainty a lowers i∗A.
Importantly, the optimal portfolio choice i∗A is falling in the level of transparency piA.
Why is this the case? Consider a bank which knows that iA will be public information
with certainty: piA = 1. By Corollary 2.2, a higher value of iA increases the likelihood
of a bank run. This reduces the expected marginal benefit of iA.
Consider now a bank which knows that iA will remain hidden: piA = 0. The bank is of
course free to choose the value of iA which is optimal under full transparency. If the bank
did so and creditors expected that, there would be no difference between the allocation
under full transparency (piA = 1) and the one under complete opacity (piA = 0). Bank
runs would happen whenever θA turned out to be too low, but the bank would choose
the risk of a crisis optimally by trading off the benefits of a high risky return against
the potential costs of early liquidation.
However, the bank has no incentive to select the same portfolio under opacity as under
transparency. If the bank’s portfolio choice is not observable, the risk of a bank run does
not depend directly on iA anymore, but on creditors’ expectations iˆA. An opaque bank
does not change these expectations through its portfolio choice because iA is not observed
by creditors. Choosing a higher value of iA does not increase the likelihood of a bank
run, since creditors’ expectations iˆA must be taken as given by an opaque bank. This
is why the potential costs of early liquidation do not affect the bank’s optimal portfolio
choice if piA = 0. Only a transparent bank has an incentive to take the risk of a bank
20As shown in the proof of Lemma 2.4 in the appendix, the probability density of θA is linearly
increasing for low values of θA, flat in the middle, and then linearly decreasing for high values. The
flat part in the middle may cover almost the entire range of θA if b is sufficiently small relative to a.
Therefore, condition (A2) is compatible with a low risk of a bank run.
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run into account.
2.3. Bank Opacity
We have seen that transparency matters for the bank’s portfolio choice. An opaque bank
chooses a riskier portfolio. The bank’s portfolio choice is deterministic and households
know a bank’s level of transparency. If households have rational expectations, they know
the bank’s portfolio choice even if it is not publicly observable: iˆA = iA. It follows that
the threshold realization of θA which triggers a bank run increases as a bank becomes
more opaque and chooses a higher value of iA. This implies a higher risk of a bank run.
Proposition 2.5 summarizes the effect on the expected net value of bank A’s portfolio.
Proposition 2.5. Assume that conditions (A0)-(A3) hold. A transparent bank is worth
more than an opaque bank:
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ piA
= (1− piA) Φ2 S
2
2aR3
.
There are diminishing returns to transparency:
∂2 E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ piA2
= −Φ2 S
2
2aR3
.
The intuition is the following. Because of rational expectations, a bank is subject to
the constraint iA = iˆA in equilibrium regardless if the portfolio choice is observable or
not. A transparent bank internalizes this constraint and takes the effect of its observable
portfolio choice on creditors’ expectations into account. The transparent bank acts as a
Stackelberg leader who knows that its action iA influences the expectations of its followers
iˆA. A fully opaque bank (piA = 0) does not internalize the constraint iA = iˆA because
it knows that its portfolio choice is unobservable. The opaque bank and creditors move
simultaneously. The opaque bank takes iˆA as given and chooses iA as a best response.
Since the solution of this problem is different from the one of the Stackelberg problem, the
opaque bank faces a credibility problem. This results in an inefficiently high probability
of a bank run and a low expected net value of its portfolio.21
Transparency has value in this model. Note however that the role of market discipline
is not to mitigate an agency problem. Banker A’s preferences about the portfolio choice
are perfectly aligned with households’ preferences.22 This is different from the models of
Calomiris and Kahn (1991) or Diamond and Rajan (2001). In these models, there is an
agency problem between bank managers and outside investors. Short-term funding can
21The bank’s credibility problem is similar to the problem of time-inconsistency in Kydland and
Prescott (1977). There is an important difference however: the bank’s portfolio choice does not depend
on its timing, but on its observability.
22In this sense, the bank forms a team with each one of its individual investors. In contrast to the
team problems analyzed by Marschack (1955) and Radner (1962), communication (i.e. transparency)
between team members (i.e. between the bank and its creditors) does not simply serve as to coordinate
behavior.
13
be used to discipline the bank manager’s behavior. In my model, there is no benefit of
short-term funding. The bank’s financial structure is exogenous. Proposition 2.5 states
that for a bank which is susceptible to runs, transparency is necessary for a portfolio
choice which takes the risk of a bank run into account. This is true even in the absence
of agency problems.
2.4. Bank Competition
So far, I have taken banker A’s portfolio size kA, the price of her banking services τA,
and the level of transparency piA as given. These values are determined by supply and
demand in the market for banking services. In the beginning of period 0, banker A and
banker B simultaneously decide on the price charged for their banking services as well
as on the transparency of their balance sheet. Households decide how to allocate their
wealth across the two banks. Both bankers are identical at the competition stage in the
beginning of period 0.
2.4.1. Demand for Banking Services
The representative household owns an endowment of quantity w. Some part kj he hands
over to banker j who promises an expected return rj (j = A,B).
max
kA,kB≥0
kArA + kBrB (1a)
subject to: kA + kB ≤ w . (1b)
Whoever of the two bankers can credibly promise the higher expected return, captures
the entire market. If rA = rB, households are indifferent with respect to any feasible
choice of kA and kB. The household only cares about the expected return of a security.
To him it does not matter if this security is bank equity or a short-term debt claim.
2.4.2. Supply of Banking Services
We continue to focus on banker A. She is choosing τA and piA in order to maximize her
objective function:
max
τA,piA∈[0,1]
τA E [VA − 1runAΦ] = τA E
[
S(kA − i∗A) +Rmin{i∗A, θA} − 1runAΦ
]
. (2a)
She needs to take households’ demand for her services into account:
kA =

w if rA > rB ,
[0, w] if rA = rB ,
0 if rA < rB ,
(2b)
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where the expected return rA which banker A can credibly offer to households is given
as:
rA =
(1− τA)E [VA − 1runAΦ]
kA
. (2c)
Through market discipline, banker A’s choice of transparency piA affects i
∗
A and the
likelihood of a bank run. The corresponding expressions hold symmetrically for banker
B.
2.4.3. Equilibrium
At the competition stage in the beginning of period 0, banker A and banker B play
a perfect-information simultaneous-move price-setting game. We are interested in the
following standard Nash allocation.
Definition A Nash equilibrium consists of a combination of values pi∗A, pi
∗
B, τ
∗
A, and τ
∗
B,
such that banker A solves (2), while banker B simultaneously solves her corresponding
constrained maximization problem.
Transparency matters for banks. Market discipline raises the value of a bank because
it solves the bank’s credibility problem and induces a prudent portfolio choice. This is
reflected by the equilibrium outcome in this economy.
Proposition 2.6. Full transparency is the unique equilibrium: pi∗A = pi
∗
B = 1. The two
banks charge: τ ∗A = τ
∗
B =
ρ−S
ρ−S
2
with:
ρ =
E [VA − 1runAΦ]
kA
=
E [VB − 1runBΦ]
kB
, and: kA = kB =
w
2
.
The two bankers compete for household funds in order to invest them. I consider the
case that µ + a + b < kA. In equilibrium, the marginal unit of resources collected by
banker A is invested in the safe project yielding a return S. Market power allows banker
A to pay households an equilibrium return rA = (1 − τ ∗A)ρ smaller than the marginal
return S. Each banker has monopoly access to one risky project of limited size, while
the safe project is perfectly scalable. The difference between the expected social return
on her portfolio ρ and the safe return S measures the social value-added of the risky
project which the banker has exclusive access to.
A banker agrees with households that the expected net value of her portfolio should
be maximized. Since market discipline has value in this economy, full transparency is
the unique equilibrium.
2.5. Disclosure of Losses
As mentioned above, most contributions to the literature have studied the disclosure of
bank losses. Results which apply to that problem do not extend to the disclosure of a
bank’s portfolio choice. To make this point, I briefly show that it is possible that public
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information about the risky project is harmful while at the same time disclosure of the
bank’s portfolio choice is beneficial.
So far I have assumed that at t = 1 the realization of θA is public information. Now
I assume that the realization of θA becomes public information with some exogenous
probability ψ ∈ [0, 1]. Proposition 2.7 follows.
Proposition 2.7. Assume that S > R−S. The expected net value of bank A’s portfolio
is falling in ψ and increasing in pi:
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ ψ
< 0 , and
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ piA
= (1− piA)ψ2Φ2 S
2
2aR3
> 0 .
The intuition is simple. The assumption S > R − S is sufficient to guarantee that
i∗A < µ. This means that public news about above-average realizations θA ≥ µ do
not trigger a bank run. If θA is not revealed in the interim period, creditors expect
E[θA|Q1] = µ for lack of additional information. Again, nobody has a reason to run and
the bank is stable. Only public news about a low realization of θA can trigger a run.
There is nothing to gain from positive news about θA while there are potential costs
from negative news about θA. This is why public information about θA in the interim
period is harmful.
High risk exposure increases the range of realizations θA which trigger a run given
that θA is observable in the interim period. To the extent that this may happen (ψ > 0),
market discipline continues to matter as it induces a prudent portfolio choice. For this
reason, public information about iA is beneficial.
3. Private Information
The previous section has described the role of market discipline. Banks have a strong
incentive to be transparent in order to reap the benefits of market discipline and financial
stability. This section departs from the previous one by introducing private information.
Private information by banks means that creditors do not know an opaque bank’s port-
folio choice even under rational expectations. As we will see below, this may give rise to
a benefit of opacity because it allows to pool weak banks with strong banks when public
news about risky projects are bad. Information spillovers introduce a second motive for
opacity. The equilibrium choice of transparency may have an interior solution now. I
modify the setup by the following assumption.
Screening. Bankers can screen their risky project before they choose their portfolio.
Screening is costless. With probability p, banker j learns the true value of θj already at
the end of period 0. With probability 1−p screening fails and the banker learns nothing.
Success in screening is not observable by outsiders and statistically independent across
the two bankers. The information derived from screening is private. As before, θA and
θB become public knowledge at t = 1.
Timing. The timing of the new setup is summarized below:
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t=0 Bankers A and B publicly choose transparency piA and piB and offer prices for their
services τA and τB. They collect funds from households.
Both bankers screen their respective risky project.
The two banks select a portfolio: iA and iB. The portfolio choices iA and iB become
public information instantaneously with probability piA and piB, respectively. This
allows banks to react to the portfolio choice of their rival.
t=1 All agents observe θA and θB. Banker A offers a new face value of debt DA + dA
due in period 2. Banker B offers DB + dB. Creditors decide whether to roll-over
the short-term debt of the respective bank.
t=2 The payoff of projects net of liquidation costs is distributed among households and
bankers. All agents consume.
3.1. Bank Runs
As before, I focus attention on banker A and proceed by backward induction. In the
interim period t = 1, banker A holds a portfolio of size kA. Creditors’ date 1 information
set Q1 includes θA and θB. If iA or iB are publicly observable, they are also included in
Q1. If bank A’s portfolio choice iA is publicly observed, creditors know the exact value
of VA at t = 1 already. If iA is not observed, creditors have to form a belief about iA and
about VA. Creditors know that with probability p banker A has successfully screened
the risky project in period 0. If iA is not observed, creditors assign probability p to the
event iA = θA and V
i
A(θA) ≡ SkA + (R − S)θA. With probability 1 − p, banker A has
failed at screening and chosen iA 6= θA. This implies a lower portfolio value for any value
of θA: V
u
A (Q1) < V iA(θA).
If a creditor considers bank A’s short-term debt as riskless, she will roll-over at the
same conditions as before: a payment of DA due at t = 2. If after the observation of θA
(and possibly iA and iB) a creditor assumes that bank A may not be able to fully serve
DA in period 2, she may only roll-over if banker A offers a higher face value DA + dA as
payout in t = 2. The term dA is a risk premium. If the amount which creditors believe
banker A will actually be able to pay in t = 2 is too low, no risk premium is high enough
and creditors will prefer immediate repayment of DA in t = 1.
In Section 2, there was no uncertainty about VA in t = 1 even if iA was not public
information. Short-term debt was either riskless or default in period 2 was certain. This
is different now and introduces a role for risk premia. Just as in Section 2, a bank run
occurs whenever creditors believe that the gross value of bank A’s portfolio VA is not
sufficient to cover the claims both of the banker and of creditors.
Lemma 3.1. A bank run is the only Nash equilibrium if and only if: E[VA|Q1] < D˜A,
where D˜A =
DA
1−τA .
17
Transparency
With probability piA banker A’s portfolio choice iA is public information. Both iA and
VA are directly observed at t = 1 in this case. The incidence of a bank run follows from
the analysis in Section 2.1:
Pro(iA) ≡ Pr
[
θA <
1
R
[SiA − (SkA − D˜A)]
]
.
Opacity
If bank A’s portfolio choice is not public information, iA and VA are not directly ob-
servable at t = 1. In this case, creditors take into account the possibility that with
probability p screening was successful and banker A has chosen iA = θA at the end of
period 0. Creditors expect banker A’s unobservable portfolio to have a value of:
E[VA|Q1] = p
[
SkA + (R− S)θA
]
+ (1− p)
[
S(kA − iˆA) +R min
{
iˆA , θA
}]
,
where iˆA is the portfolio choice which creditors at date 1 believe banker A has selected
if screening was unsuccessful. If banker A’s portfolio choice is not public information,
the probability of a bank run is equal to:
Pru
(
iˆA
)
≡
Pr
{
p
[
SkA + (R− S)θA
]
+ (1− p)
[
S(kA − iˆA) + R min
{
iˆA , θA
}]
< D˜A
}
.
This probability does not directly depend on banker A’s portfolio choice iA, but rather
on creditors’ date 1 belief about banker A’s portfolio choice. Screening efficiency p is
important as well. A high value of p lowers the risk of a bank run.
3.2. Portfolio Choice
I continue to proceed by backward induction. Anticipating the contingency of a bank
run, banker A divides her funds between the risky and the riskless project. Since she
is compensated by a positive share of the net value of the bank’s portfolio, her prefer-
ences and the preferences of households about the optimal portfolio choice are perfectly
aligned.
If screening was successful, this problem has a simple solution: iA = θA. If screening
has failed, there are two additional cases to consider: (1.) Banker B’s portfolio choice
might not be public information. This happens with probability 1 − piB. This case is
identical to the bank’s problem studied in Section 2.2. Lemma 2.4 gives the solution to
bankerA’s portfolio choice. (2.) BankerB’s portfolio choice might be public information.
Now there are two possibilities:
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(2.a) Banker B’s portfolio choice might be the solution to banker B’s portfolio choice
problem subject to public information only (that is, knowledge of iA if it is public
information as well). This reveals that banker B has failed at screening. Her
portfolio choice iB does not contain additional information for banker A. Again,
Lemma 2.4 gives the solution to banker A’s portfolio choice.
(2.b) Banker B’s portfolio choice might be different from the solution to banker B’s
portfolio choice problem subject to public information only. This reveals that
banker B has screened her risky project successfully. Optimal behavior by banker
B dictates that iB = θB. Banker A does not know θA but she learns the realization
of θB from iB. She can adjust her portfolio choice to the information contained in
θB about θA.
Lemma 3.2 describes banker A’s optimal portfolio choice in this latter case. She does
not know θA but she has learned θB from iB. This happens with probability (1− p)ppiB.
Lemma 3.2. Define: µˆ ≡ E[θA|θB]. If θB is known, the optimal portfolio choice is:
i∗∗A = µˆ − a
(
2S
R
− 1
)
− piA Φ S
R2
,
if conditions (A0)-(A3) are jointly satisfied.
Now the optimal portfolio choice differs from the solution in Section 2.2. To the extent
that θA and θB are correlated, banker A’s posterior mean of θA reacts to the information
contained in θB. Her portfolio choice shifts up or down together with the updated
expected maximum project size µˆ. Her uncertainty about the common component Θ
may decrease after the observation of θB, but under conditions (A1)-(A3) this does not
affect the optimal portfolio choice. The uncertainty which matters for banker A at the
margin is the one stemming from the idiosyncratic component εA measured by parameter
a. Importantly, i∗∗A is falling in the level of transparency piA just as i
∗
A.
3.3. Bank Opacity
In order to keep the analytical expressions as simple as possible, I substitute assump-
tion (A2) with a more restrictive condition, which requires the screening efficiency p to
be sufficiently low. This makes sure that, even if iA is unobserved, the unconditional
probability density of θA is still flat at the threshold value which triggers a run.
(A2’) µ− a+ b < 1
R−pS
[
(1− p)S (µ− a (2S
R
− 1)− Φ S
R2
)− (SkA − D˜) ] .
Lemma 3.3. Assume that conditions (A0), (A1), (A2’), and (A3) hold. Transparency
affects the expected net value of banker A’s portfolio according to:
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ piA
= (1−piA) 1− p
R− pS Φ
2 S
2
2aR2
−Φ
[
(1−p) Pro(i∗A)−Pru(i∗A)
]
≡ ∆(piA) .
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There are diminishing returns to transparency:
∂2 E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ pi2A
= − 1− p
R− pS Φ
2 S
2
2aR2
R + pS
R
.
The first term of the marginal benefit of transparency is similar to the one derived
in Section 2.3. It captures the benefit of market discipline: a portfolio choice which
takes the risk of a bank run into account. Note that this term is equal to the marginal
benefit in Proposition 2.5 multiplied by the factor R(1−p)
R−pS . This factor is smaller than 1
and decreasing in p. If p = 0, there is no difference between this term and the term in
Proposition 2.5. Market discipline is useful only if there is a risk of a bank run. The
probability p that screening is successful reduces the risk of a bank run and therefore
also the benefit of market discipline.
The second term of the marginal benefit of transparency is new and measures the
difference between the expected bank run costs if iA is observed and if iA is unobserved.
Note that i∗∗A does not show up in this expression. This is because of the following
Corollary.
Corollary 3.4. The probability of a bank run is independent of the observability of θB:
Pro(i
∗
A) = Pro(i
∗∗
A ) and Pru(i
∗
A) = Pru(i
∗∗
A ) .
Corollary 3.4 follows from the derivation of Lemma 3.3 in the appendix. What is this
second role of transparency besides market discipline? The risk of a bank run depends on
the properties of creditors’ date 1 expectation of the gross value of banker A’s portfolio.
Consider now this expectation conditional on some realization θA:
E [VA|θA] = pE [VA|θA, iA = θA] + (1− p)E [VA|θA, iA = i∗A] .
For simplicity, I assume here that iB is unobservable. The left hand side of the equa-
tion gives creditors’ expectation of VA if iA remains hidden. The right hand side gives
creditors’ average expectation of VA if iA is observable. It is averaged across the two
possible values of iA which creditors may observe. Actually, creditors’ expectation of VA
is equal to its true value if iA is observed since in this case all uncertainty is revealed at
t = 1. The equality follows from the assumption that creditors have rational expecta-
tions. Whether creditors observe iA at date 1 does not affect their average expectation
of VA. Note however that E [VA|θA, iA = θA] 6= E [VA|θA, iA = i∗A]. Whether creditors’
observe iA at date 1 does affect the variability of their expectation of VA. Variability of
expectations may be beneficial or not depending on the realization of θA.
1. E [VA|θA, iA = i∗A] < E [VA|θA] < D˜A < E [VA|θA, iA = θA]: Here θA is very low. A
bank run is triggered even if iA remains hidden. The probability of being in this
region is Pru(i
∗
A). Transparency is beneficial because it allows to avoid a bank run
with probability p. For very low values of θA, banker A has nothing to lose from
observability but everything to gain. Adding variability to creditors’ expectation
is beneficial in this case.
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2. E [VA|θA, iA = i∗A] < D˜A < E [VA|θA] < E [VA|θA, iA = θA]: Here θA is high enough
to avoid a run if iA remains hidden but still too low to avoid a run if iA is observed
and equal to i∗A. The probability of this case is Pro(i
∗
A) − Pru(i∗A). Opacity is
beneficial because it rules out bank runs completely. Adding variability to cred-
itors’ expectation is harmful as it introduces the possibility of a bank run with
probability 1− p.
3. D˜A < E [VA|θA, iA = i∗A] < E [VA|θA] < E [VA|θA, iA = θA]: If θA is sufficiently high,
the observability of iA does not matter for the risk of a bank run since it is always
zero.
This explains the second effect of transparency on the expected net value of banker A’s
portfolio. For a given portfolio choice policy, an increase in piA raises the probability of
a bank run by:
(1− p) [Pro(i∗A)− Pru(i∗A)]− pPru(i∗A) = (1− p) Pro(i∗A)− Pru(i∗A)
=
p
2a
[
µ− a− 1− p
R− pS
S2
R
i∗A +
R + (1− p)S
R(R− pS) (SkA − D˜A)
]
.
If p = 0, the value of this expression is zero and we are back in Section 2. For positive
values of p close to zero, the term inside of the square brackets may be negative. In
particular, this is the case if R
S
and SkA − D˜ are not too high. For this range of
parameter values, a bank gains more by demonstrating its unlikely success in screening
than by insuring itself against the likely screening failure through opacity. An increase
in transparency not only improves banker A’s portfolio choice but it also reduces the risk
of a bank run for a given portfolio choice policy. As p is increased, the term inside of the
square brackets eventually turns positive. Efficient screening allows opacity to reduce
the incidence of bank runs by pooling the large probability mass of informed banks with
the small mass of uninformed ones. This introduces a cost of transparency.
Lemma 3.5. There is some value p ∈ (0, 1) such that the following is true: If p ∈ [0, p],
then ∆(piA) > 0 for some range of positive values piA ∈ [0, pi(p)) with pi(0) = 1.
This Lemma simply states that as long as screening is not too efficient, the expected
net value of banker A’s portfolio is maximized by choosing a strictly positive level of
transparency. In contrast to the result of Section 2.3, this level may now be different
from one. Market discipline is still important but there is an additional role of trans-
parency. The assumption of screening introduces a new source of risk. Opacity allows to
insure banks against the risk of screening failure. This insurance has value if screening
efficiency p is sufficiently high. Transparency precludes this risk sharing opportunity.
The Hirshleifer effect of public information creates a social role for opacity which must
be weighed against the associated reduction of market discipline.
As stated in Lemma 3.3, the returns to transparency are decreasing. An increase in
piA moves iA closer towards the level which maximizes the expected net value of banker
A’s portfolio. As piA tends towards one, the associated marginal gain becomes infinitely
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small. Also the Hirshleifer term is concave in piA. It measures the difference between
the expected cost of a bank run if iA is observed and if iA is unobserved. This difference
is increasing in piA. Insurance through opacity becomes more efficient as transparency
is increased.
Lemma 3.3 describes how the introduction of private information changes the effect
of a bank’s level of transparency on its own portfolio value. Lemma 3.6 shows that with
private information transparency also matters for the competitor’s portfolio value.
Lemma 3.6. Assume that conditions (A0), (A1), (A2), and (A3) hold. The value of a
bank is increasing in its competitor’s level of transparency:
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ piB
= (1− p) p
(
E [VA | iA = i∗∗A ] − E [VA | iA = i∗A]
)
= (1− p) p R
4a
E
([
E [Θ|∅]−Θ
]2
−
[
E [Θ|θB]−Θ
]2)
= (1− p) p Rb
3
24a2
.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Whenever banker A has failed in
screening project A but banker B has successfully screened project B, there is a benefit
for banker A in observing iB. This happens with probability (1 − p)p. Banker B’s
informed portfolio choice reveals the value of θB. The benefit for banker A of observing
θB is proportional to the reduction in the error variance of her forecast of Θ. If b is high
and a is low, the variation in θB is driven to a large extent by variation in Θ. In this
case, θB is very informative with respect to Θ and banker A benefits a lot from observing
θB.
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Banker A’s returns to piA are decreasing while the returns to piB are constant. This
is because a marginal increase in piA changes i
∗
A and i
∗∗
A only by a marginal amount. In
contrast, the observation of θB causes a discrete change from i
∗
A to i
∗∗
A . The expected
welfare gain of this discrete change is not decreasing in the level of piB. The key difference
for banker A between piA and piB is of course that she can choose piA but not piB. These
values are determined by strategic competition as described below.
3.4. Bank Competition
As in Section 2, banker A and banker B compete for households’ funds at the beginning
of period 0. Each of them sets a price and a level of transparency in order to maximize her
expected payout subject to the constraint set by households’ demand for intermediation
services.
23A slightly modified version of the bank’s portfolio choice problem with discrete support for θA
and θB can be written down. Theorem 4 of Blackwell (1951) applies to this modified version and
demonstrates that the expected net value of banker A’s portfolio must be increasing in the precision of
θB as a signal of θA.
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3.4.1. Supply of Banking Services
We continue to focus on banker A. Just as in Section 2, she is choosing τA and piA in
order to maximize her objective function:
τA E [VA − 1runAΦ] = τA E
[
kA − iA +Rmin{iA, θA} − PrrunAΦ
]
.
With respect to Section 2, there are two changes. First of all, banker A’s portfolio choice
iA depends on her own uncertain screening success, as well as on the uncertain success
in screening of banker B and whether iB is observable or not:
iA =

θA with probability p ,
i∗∗A with probability (1− p)ppiB ,
i∗A with probability (1− p)(1− ppiB) .
The probability of a run by banker A’s short-term creditors in the interim period depends
on banker A’s screening success and the observability of iA:
PrrunA =

0 with probability piAp ,
Pro(i
∗
A) with probability piA(1− p) ,
Pru(i
∗
A) with probability 1− piA .
The corresponding expressions hold symmetrically for banker B. Banker A’s choice
of transparency piA affects iA through market discipline. It also affects PrrunA both
through market discipline and through the Hirshleifer effect. In addition to these two
effects, there is an information externality on banker B which affects iB. Banker A
understands that her actions affect both rA and rB.
3.4.2. Equilibrium
Private information has introduced two additional roles of transparency. Market dis-
cipline raises the value of a bank because it induces a prudent portfolio choice. But
transparency also punishes unlucky banks who are surprised by a low value of θA or θB
in the interim period. And, finally, transparency gives rise to informational spillovers
to a bank’s competitor. These three roles of transparency taken together determine the
equilibrium levels of piA and piB.
Proposition 3.7. The equilibrium is unique and symmetric. An interior solution pi∗A =
pi∗B ∈ (0, 1) is characterized by:
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ pi∗A
− (1− τ ∗B)
∂ E [VB − 1runBΦ]
∂ pi∗A
= 0,
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where:
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ pi∗A
= (1− pi∗A)
1− p
R− pS
Φ2S2
2aR2
− pΦ
2a
[
µ− a− (1− p)S
2
R(R− pS) i
∗
A +
R + (1− p)S
R(R− pS) (SkA − D˜A)
]
,
and
∂ E [VB − 1runBΦ]
∂ pi∗A
= (1− p) p Rb
3
24a2
.
The two banks charge: τ ∗A = τ
∗
B =
ρ−S
ρ−S
2
with:
ρ =
E [VA − 1runAΦ]
kA
=
E [VB − 1runBΦ]
kB
, and: kA = kB =
w
2
.
Each of the two bankers wants to increase households’ demand for her own services as
this allows her to charge a higher price. Demand can be increased by offering a higher
expected return than the rival bank. This can be done in two ways: (1.) A banker can
increase the expected net value of her own portfolio, or (2.) she can reduce the expected
net value of her rival’s portfolio. Proposition 3.7 describes the optimal weight which a
banker assigns to each of these two options. For a given return rA offered to households,
an increase in the expected net value of her own portfolio is fully captured by banker A
through a corresponding increase in the price τA. At the same time, a reduction in the
expected net value of her rival’s portfolio benefits banker A only to the extent that it
reduces rB. This is why in the first order condition of pi
∗
A in Proposition 3.7 the marginal
reduction of the expected net value of banker B’s portfolio is weighted by the fraction
(1− τ ∗B) which is passed on to households by banker B and which enters rB.
In contrast to Section 2, the bank’s equilibrium choice of transparency may have an
interior solution now. The expected net value of banker A’s portfolio is concave in her
own level of transparency, while the expected net value of banker B’s portfolio is linear
in piA.
The introduction of private information has profoundly changed the way transparency
is chosen in this model. First of all, opacity insures unlucky banks against the risk of
unfavorable news about the risky project (the Hirshleifer effect). The second change is
even more fundamental. A banker does not choose transparency anymore to maximize
the expected net value of her portfolio. Because of an information externality, a banker
reduces this value if this hurts the rival more than it hurts herself. This is the case if
the composition of her balance sheet is proprietary information, that is, if θA and θB are
correlated (b > 0). The two bankers interact as in a prisoner’s dilemma and both end
up with an expected net portfolio value which is lower than it could be.
Comparative statics are ambiguous as parameters have or may have opposing effects
on market discipline, the Hirshleifer effect, and information spillovers. Through the
social return ρ, changes in parameter values also affect the equilibrium prices τ ∗A, τ
∗
B, as
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well as the values of D˜A and D˜B.
24 If R is sufficiently close to S, ρ is close to S and τ ∗A
is close to zero for all parameter values. This allows us to draw conclusions with respect
to some (but not all) model parameters.
Corollary 3.8. If R is sufficiently close to S, the equilibrium level of transparency pi∗A
is falling in:
- the average maximum size of the risky project µ,
- the common component of project risk b,
- the amount of bank equity q.
The model predicts that, ceteris paribus, a bank with profitable investment opportu-
nities (high µ) which are strongly correlated to the projects funded by its competitor
(high b) will choose to be particularly opaque in equilibrium. Similarly, better capital-
ized banks (high q) are expected to be more opaque. High values of µ and q render a
bank less vulnerable to a run. This makes insurance through opacity more efficient and
strengthens the Hirshleifer effect. A high value of b increases the correlation between θA
and θB. This intensifies the proprietary nature of private information. The comparative
statics of the remaining parameters are less conclusive. For instance, an increase in the
cost of early liquidation Φ raises the importance of market discipline, but at the same
time it also makes insurance through the Hirshleifer effect more valuable.
Private information implies that full transparency (piA = 1) does not necessarily min-
imize the risk of a bank run anymore as it did in Section 2. Nevertheless, in equilibrium
the marginal effect of transparency may still be stabilizing as stated by the following
Corollary.
Corollary 3.9. If pi∗A has a positive solution, a marginal increase in piA from its equi-
librium level lowers the probability of a bank run.
This Corollary follows from the observation that an increase in piA always decreases
the expected gross value of banker A’s portfolio while it increases the expected net value
of banker B’s portfolio. Banker A has no incentive to set a positive level of transparency
piA > 0 unless this lowers the risk of a run on her own bank.
3.5. More Than Two Banks
To study the role of bank competition, I extend the analysis from above and assume
that there are N = 3, 4, 5, ... banks competing for households’ funds. Apart from this,
the environment remains unchanged. Each banker has access to a riskless project and a
24For a fixed amount of bank equity q, the equilibrium amount of short-term debt financing of bank
A is given as w2 − q. The equilibrium return on short-term debt and bank equity must both be rA. This
gives as the equilibrium face value of short-term debt: DA = (1 − τ∗A)ρ(w2 − q). Parameter changes
affecting the social return ρ also affect D˜A =
DA
1−τ∗A = ρ(
w
2 − q), even though the amount of short-term
debt financing remains fixed.
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bank-specific risky project. The maximum project size of each risky project is the sum
of the component Θ, which is common to all N bankers, and the idiosyncratic part εj,
which is specific to the risky project of banker j only. A banker j’s information set Qj0
at the end of period 0 may consist of up to N different realizations θl = Θ + εl. As
before, I consider the case that in equilibrium the first best portfolio choice is always
interior for all realizations of θj : µ+ a+ b < kj =
w
N
.
Proposition 3.10. For any number N = 3, 4, 5, ... of banks, the equilibrium is unique
and symmetric. An interior solution pi∗A ∈ (0, 1) is characterized by:
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ pi∗A
− (1− τ ∗B)
∂ E [VB − 1runBΦ]
∂ pi∗A
= 0,
where:
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ pi∗A
= (1− pi∗A)
1− p
R− pS
Φ2S2
2aR2
− pΦ
2a
[
µ− a− (1− p)S
2
R(R− pS) i
∗
A +
R + (1− p)S
R(R− pS) (SkA − D˜A)
]
,
and
∂ E [VB − 1runBΦ]
∂ pi∗A
= (1− p) p R
4a
N−2∑
j=0
(
N − 2
j
)
(1− pi∗Np)N−2−j(pi∗Np)j
[
E
[
e(j)2
]− E [e(j + 1)2] ].
The variable e(j) = E
[
Θ|QB0
] − Θ denotes banker B’s forecast error with respect to Θ
after the observation of j signals θj: |QB0 | = j.
Banker A charges: τ ∗A =
ρ−S
ρ− S
N
with: ρ =
E[VA−1runAΦ]
kA
, and: kA =
w
N
.
The impact of transparency on the own bank does not depend on the number of
competitors. Neither the role of market discipline nor the Hirshleifer effect are affected
by N . This is different for information spillovers. Knowing the realization of θA is
valuable for all bankers. Without loss of generality, as in the case of two bankers I focus
on banker A and banker B. It must be true that banker A has screened successfully
(probability p) and that banker B had no success in screening herself (probability 1−p)
in order for an increase in transparency by banker A to have an effect on the expected
return offered by banker B (and all other bankers in the economy). But the expected
benefit which banker B derives in this case from the observation of θA depends on the
number of other signals which banker B observes besides of θA.
Lemma 3.11. The expected benefit of observing one additional signal is falling in the
total number of banks N :
∂ E [VB − 1runBΦ]
∂ pi∗A
∣∣∣∣
N=j
>
∂ E [VB − 1runBΦ]
∂ pi∗A
∣∣∣∣
N=j+1
.
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For a given equilibrium level of transparency pi∗A, the expected number of signals
observed by banker B is increasing in N . The higher is the total number of signals
observed, the more precise banker B’s posterior of Θ becomes and the smaller becomes
the expected benefit of observing the additional signal θA. The error variance of her
forecast error is falling in the number of signals, but it is falling at a declining rate. This
property of the model is key for the following result about the role of competition for
bank transparency.
Proposition 3.12. If R is sufficiently close to S, the equilibrium level of transparency
is monotonically increasing in the number of banks while the probability of a bank run
for any given bank is falling.
We know from Lemma 3.11 that information spillovers are decreasing in the number
of banks. This reduces the private cost of transparency. However, the trade-off given
in Proposition 3.10 also includes the equilibrium price of banking services. Only the
fraction 1 − τ ∗B of banker B’s portfolio value is passed on to households and enters the
return rB. If banker B charges a low price τ
∗
B, the return rB offered to households is
particularly sensitive to changes in the expected net value of banker B’s portfolio. This
makes it easier for banker A to reduce rB through hiding iA. The equilibrium price τ
∗
B is
falling in N . Only if this effect does not outweigh the reduction of information spillovers
described in Lemma 3.11, transparency is increasing with bank competition. If R is
close to S, the equilibrium price of banking services is close to zero for all values of N .
This is a sufficient condition for a positive effect of bank competition on transparency.
This positive effect of bank competition on transparency is remarkable for two reasons.
First, this prediction is in line with the empirical evidence. Jiang, Levine and Lin (2014)
estimate that the removal of regulatory impediments to bank competition by individual
states in the U.S. has improved the informational content of banks’ financial statements.
Proposition 3.12 suggests that this might have been driven by a reduction of strategic
concerns as regional markets became more competitive. Secondly, as strategic concerns
are reduced and transparency increases, the risk of a bank run is falling for any given
bank. A higher number of banks increases financial stability in the model through an
improvement in market discipline. This is in contrast to the widely held view of a
trade-off between financial stability and bank competition.25
4. Efficiency and Policy
Until now, the analysis of the model has been purely positive. We have learned that
a bank’s equilibrium choice of transparency may have an interior solution if its port-
folio choice is based on private information. Transparency is monotonically increasing
in the number of competitors while the risk of a bank run is falling (as long as the
rents of bankers are not too high). We also have learned that the equilibrium level of
transparency does not maximize the expected net value of a bank’s portfolio because
25This view is well exemplified by Keeley (1990).
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of an information externality. The fact that the market equilibrium described above is
reminiscent of a prisoner’s dilemma suggests that there is room for policy.
4.1. Transparency ex-ante
There are various sources of inefficiency in the model: banks have market power, their
portfolio choice is subject to a credibility problem, and costly bank runs occur in equi-
librium. In order to study the potential benefit of policy interventions, I use a notion of
constrained efficiency. For the case of two banks, the social planner solves:
max
piA,piB
E
{
VA − 1runAΦ + VB − 1runBΦ
}
.
The planner maximizes the expected value of aggregate consumption. She cannot di-
rectly change banks’ portfolio choices or creditors’ decision to roll-over in the interim
period. She can only control the two banks’ levels of transparency piA and piB set in the
beginning of period 0. Changing bank A’s level of transparency piA affects iA through
market discipline. It also affects the probability of a bank run on bank A through mar-
ket discipline and the Hirshleifer effect. It potentially affects bank B’s portfolio choice
through the information externality.
The first order condition for a constrained efficient choice of transparency piA reads
as:
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ piSBA
+
∂ E [VB − 1runBΦ]
∂ piSBA
= 0.
The contrast to the equilibrium choice of piA described in Proposition 3.7 is evident. The
planner internalizes the information externality from an increase in piA on the expected
net value of banker B’s portfolio. This information externality increases the marginal
social benefit of transparency and contributes to a high value of piSBA . For bank A’s equi-
librium choice the opposite is true: the information externality on banker B’s portfolio
value reduces the equilibrium value of transparency pi∗A.
Proposition 4.1. The gap between the second best level of transparency piSBA and the
market outcome pi∗A is positive if and only if b > 0 and p ∈ (0, 1). If R is sufficiently
close to S, this gap is:
- increasing in the common component of project risk b,
- falling in the idiosyncratic component of project risk a,
- increasing in the return of the risky project R.
The market failure in the supply of public information about banks’ risk exposure is
severe if information spillovers are large. This is the case if the observation of θB helps
to predict θA (high b and low a), and if this prediction is valuable (high R).
A high value of b characterizes environments in which one banker’s private information
about a borrower is a close substitute to another banker’s private information about her
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own borrower. This might be the case because both bankers are lending funds to firms
or homeowners in the same region. The random variable Θ captures a factor which all
firms or homeowners in the region are exposed to and which the information acquired
by a local banker helps to predict. A high value of b could also apply to the situation
of two banks which lend to different firms in the same industry. By screening one firm,
a banker might learn industry-specific information which is valuable to a second banker
who has to decide on a loan to a different firm of the same sector.
Both if p = 0 or p = 1, the inefficiency in piA disappears. These are the two extreme
cases of a total absence of private information (p = 0) and full information (p = 1). In
both cases, there is nothing to learn from observing a competitor’s portfolio choice. For
all intermediate values p ∈ (0, 1), there is a private and social benefit from observing
the portfolio choice of other banks. These information spillovers result in a gap between
the second-best level of transparency and banks’ equilibrium choice. This mechanism
rationalizes the puzzling observation that real-world investors choose to lend money
to opaque banks while many commentators argue that bank opacity is higher than it
should be. In the model, information spillovers create an environment in which the
market rewards banks which set an excessive level of opacity.
If a policy maker has the option to increase piA in this environment, for instance
through minimum public disclosure requirements or through periodic and standardized
public stress tests, this is beneficial as it improves the portfolio choice of all banks. It
may also reduce the risk of a bank run as stated by the following Proposition.
Proposition 4.2. If R is sufficiently close to S and pi∗A > 0, the risk of a bank run is
higher for the equilibrium level of transparency pi∗A than for the the second-best level pi
SB
A .
This result is remarkable for the following reason. As described above, several models
of optimal bank opacity stress the role of the Hirshleifer effect in creating social costs
of transparency. These contributions study environments where there is no need for
market discipline. The analysis above demonstrates that even if the Hirshleifer effect
is operating and public disclosure requirements increase the risk of a bank run for a
given investment policy, they may actually reduce the risk of a bank run through the
associated improvement in market discipline.
4.2. Transparency ex-post
The model assumes that a bank cannot decide to increase its level of transparency
in the interim period after public news about θA and θB has arrived. The reason for
this assumption is that it takes time to credibly communicate information to outsiders.
Disclosed information needs to be verified by external auditors or bank supervisors. The
“quickest” of the recent stress test exercises was the 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program in the U.S., which took three months from the official announcement until the
release of the results.26
26See Table 1 in Candelon and Sy (2015).
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The stress tests recently performed in the U.S. and in Europe at the peak of the
Financial Crisis may be viewed as the supply of public information about banks’ risk
exposure after unfavorable news about θA and θB has arrived. Through liquidity assis-
tance and public lending, policy makers were able to buy the time necessary to perform
these stress tests. The primary purpose of these stress test exercises was not to improve
market discipline in order to avoid future crises, but rather to deal with the ongoing
financial crisis. In order to study how the implementation of transparency “ex post”
(i.e. emergency stress tests) differs from transparency “ex ante” (i.e. public disclosure
requirements or periodic and standardized stress tests), I now assume that the policy
maker can increase transparency at the beginning of the interim period. In order to
capture the novel character of the stress test exercises performed during the crisis, I as-
sume that the policy maker’s option to disclose in the interim period is not anticipated
by agents.27
As before, the policy maker maximizes the expected value of aggregate consumption.
I consider the case of bank A. The problem of bank B is symmetric. Assume that iA
has not been revealed at the end of period 0. The policy maker and bank creditors play
a game. The policy maker decides whether to disclose iA. Creditors choose whether
to roll-over the bank’s short-term debt. The timing of the new sub-game starting from
t = 1 is:
t=1 All agents observe θA. The policy maker decides whether to reveal iA.
Banker A offers a new face value of debt DA+dA due in period 2. Creditors decide
whether to roll-over the short-term debt of bank A.
t=2 The payoff of projects net of liquidation costs is distributed among households and
bankers. All agents consume.
There is an upper range of realizations of θA for which even public information about
screening failure by bank A does not trigger a run. In this upper range of θA, the policy
maker’s problem is trivial. Transparency “ex post” neither benefits nor hurts anyone.
The problem is more interesting within a lower range of θA:
µ− a− b ≤ θA < θ ≡ 1
R
[SiˆA − (SkA − D˜A)] ,
where iˆA is the solution to bank A’s portfolio choice problem based on public information
only, that is, based on iB if it happened to be observable at the end of period 0. This
is the optimal portfolio choice if bank A has failed to screen successfully. If θA < θ,
disclosure of iA = iˆA triggers a bank run whereas no-disclosure might avoid it. Disclosure
of iA = θA always avoids a run. Note that θ depends on the value of iB if it happened
to be observable at the end of period 0. Assume that iB was public information. If iB
happened to be different from i∗B, it has publicly revealed the value of θB at the end of
period 0 already. In case bank A has failed at screening, it optimally has chosen iˆA = i
∗∗
A .
27The problem of anticipated disclosure ex-post can be studied as well. In this case, “transparency
ex-post” affects banks’ portfolio choice and the equilibrium choice of “transparency ex-ante”.
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A high value of θB implies a high value of i
∗∗
A . This in turn implies a wider range of
realizations of θA over which transparency “ex post” may make the difference between
a run and roll-over.
There is a second important threshold value θ. This is the lower limit of θA for which
a bank run is avoided if iA remains hidden. It is implicitly defined by:
p
[
SkA + (R− S)θ
]
+ (1− p)
[
S(kA − iˆA) + R min
{
iˆA , θ
}]
= D˜A .
This threshold value θ is strictly smaller than θ if p > 0. Just as θ, it depends on a
potential observation of iB through its impact on iˆA.
4.2.1. Uninformed Policy Maker
Here I consider a policy maker who has access to public information only. She does not
know iA. The true value of θA is revealed at t = 1 and happens to lie within the critical
range: µ−a− b < θA < θ. Since the policy maker does not know iA, her action depends
on public information only. This game has a simple equilibrium as described by the
following Proposition.
Proposition 4.3. An uninformed policy maker’s option to disclose iA at t = 1 results
in a perfect-information game with a unique equilibrium in pure strategies: Partial Rev-
elation. If θ ≤ θA < θ, iA remains hidden. If µ − a − b ≤ θA < θ, iA is revealed. The
option of transparency “ex post” reduces the probability of a run on an opaque bank from
Pru(ˆiA) to (1− p)Pru(ˆiA). This increases expected aggregate consumption by the amount
pPru(ˆiA) Φ.
The uninformed policy maker performs a public stress test exercise if news about θA is
sufficiently bad. This allows to prevent a run on all solvent banks. A number of insolvent
banks remains opaque and benefits from the Hirshleifer effect. Note that the optimal
disclosure policy is bank-specific. In case both iA and iB were not revealed at the end
of period 0, the event θA < θ < θB < θ implies that a public stress test is carried out
for bank A but not for bank B. This allows to save bank A in case iA = θA, while bank
B is safe irrespective of iB. Opaque banks which do not face a run optimally remain
opaque.
4.2.2. Informed Policy Maker
In practice, bank regulators know more about individual banks than the public. To
capture this information asymmetry, I assume now that the policy maker knows iA even
if the public does not observe it. The game played between the policy maker and bank
creditors turns Bayesian. The policy maker’s decision whether to disclose iA now may
depend on the value of iA which is observed by the policy maker but not by the public.
In particular, it may depend on bank A’s success in screening. Creditors base their
roll-over decision not only on θA but also on the policy maker’s decision whether to
disclose.
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Proposition 4.4. An informed policy maker’s option to disclose iA at t = 1 results
in a Bayesian game with two Perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies: (1.) Full
Revelation, or (2.) Partial Revelation (as in the case of an uninformed policy maker).
In the Full Revelation equilibrium, iA is disclosed for all values of θA ∈ [µ − a − b, θ].
In this case, the option of transparency “ex post” changes the probability of a run on an
opaque bank from Pru(ˆiA) to (1−p)Pro(ˆiA). This reduces expected aggregate consumption
by the amount [(1− p)Pro(ˆiA)− Pru(ˆiA)] Φ.
In both equilibria, the informed policy maker performs a public stress test exercise
if news about θA is sufficiently bad. But the threshold value triggering a stress test is
higher in the Full Revelation Equilibrium. Disclosure occurs more often. The difference
between the two equilibria is how bank creditors interpret the policy maker’s decision
not to disclose iA. In the Full Revelation Equilibrium, creditors interpret the absence of
disclosure as disclosure of insolvency. If iA is not disclosed, creditors run. The policy
maker’s best response to these beliefs is to disclose iA whenever screening was successful.
In this equilibrium, creditors are able to discriminate perfectly between solvent and
insolvent banks.28 In the Partial Revelation Equilibrium, creditors do not interpret the
absence of disclosure as a sure sign of insolvency. This allows the policy maker to avoid
banks runs on insolvent banks if θA is not too low (θ ≤ θA < θ). It is straightforward to
verify that both Perfect Bayesian equilibria survive the Cho-Kreps Intuitive Criterion.
As discussed in Section 3.3, the term (1 − p)Pro(ˆiA) − Pru(ˆiA) is positive if p is suf-
ficiently high. The Hirshleifer effect implies a social cost of transparency in this case.
If the Full Revelation Equilibrium prevails, it would be better not to have the option
of transparency “ex post”. “Suspicious” creditors force the policy maker to reveal too
much information in the interim period, which increases the probability of a bank run.
Adding the option of a stress test exercise to the policy maker’s choice set may make her
worse off. While this is impossible for a single player’s decision problem, this possibil-
ity arises in this setup because of the strategic interaction between the informed policy
maker with uninformed short-term creditors.
The Full Revelation Equilibrium may be empirically relevant as real-world stress tests
have not been bank-specific. Regulators have performed stress test exercises for a large
set of banks regardless of their individual standing on credit markets. This feature of
real-world stress tests is in line with Full Revelation as opposed to Partial Revelation.
The success of the 2009 U.S. Supervisory Capital Assessment Program is not necessarily
inconsistent with this interpretation. It came along with a detailed recapitalization plan
for under-capitalized banks. Such a credible mechanism of equity injections was absent
for the early EU-wide stress test exercises of 2010 and 2011 which triggered less positive
or even negative market reactions overall.29 The stabilizing role of the 2009 U.S. stress
test might therefore be attributed to its credible recapitalization plan rather than to
disclosure per se.
28There is full “unraveling” as in Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981).
29See Candelon and Sy (2015).
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5. Conclusion
This paper studies a model of endogenous bank transparency. In contrast to the existing
literature, I study transparency as public information about a bank’s risk exposure. This
is the kind of information which matters for market discipline and which is regulated
by Pillar 3 of Basel II. In the model, market discipline has value even in the absence of
agency problems. The reason for this result is that an opaque bank faces a credibility
problem which does not exist under transparency.
Given the importance of market discipline in preventing excessive risk taking, this
paper asks the positive question why banks choose not to be as transparent as possible.
A simple model highlights two incentives for bank opacity. (1.) Opacity allows for risk
sharing among strong and weak banks. This may reduce the incidence of bank runs for
a given degree of risk taking. (2.) Opacity allows banks to prevent information leakage
to competitors.
Motivated by real-world regulators’ usage of public disclosure requirements (e.g. Pillar
3 of Basel II), the paper also asks the normative question if we should force banks to be
more transparent than they choose to be. The analysis suggests that this is desirable to
the extent that a bank’s asset composition is proprietary information. Optimal public
disclosure requirements lower the risk of a bank run through an improvement in market
discipline. Full transparency is generally undesirable as it destroys valuable risk sharing
opportunities among strong and weak banks. As an alternative to public disclosure re-
quirements, an increase in bank competition induces an endogenous rise of transparency
in the model.
The model also allows to study emergency stress test exercises such as the ones im-
plemented at the peak of the Financial Crisis in the U.S. and in Europe. The analysis
suggests that the option to increase transparency in a crisis situation may not be a
reliable substitute for market discipline. This is especially true if “suspicious” financial
markets force the policy maker to reveal more information about bank solvency than
she would like to. In this case, the mere existence of the stress test option may actually
make matters worse and contribute to financial instability.
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A. Proofs and Derivations
Proof of Lemma 2.1
Consider an individual atomistic creditor. Debt claims are served sequentially. If all
other creditors choose not to roll-over and projects need to be liquidated prematurely,
roll-over by one individual agent means that she is repaid only if bank A can fully serve
all other creditors at t = 1. If bank A cannot fully serve all other creditors at t = 1
(DA > (1− τA)[VA−Φ]), roll-over by one individual agent yields zero. This is the case if
D˜A > VA−Φ, with D˜A ≡ DA1−τA .30 If creditors do not roll-over but D˜A ≤ VA−Φ, roll-over
by one individual agent yields DA (the bank can always serve an individual atomistic
debt claim as long as D˜A ≤ VA−Φ). Running like everyone else yields DA if D˜A ≤ VA−Φ.
If bank A is unable to fully serve all other creditors at t = 1 (if D˜A > VA − Φ), the
payout to an individual creditor who runs is random. Given that debt claims are served
sequentially, the payout of an individual creditor who runs depends on her position in
line. This position is random. Therefore, running like everyone else yields an expected
amount of (1− τA)[VA −Φ] . If all other creditors choose to roll-over, projects need not
be liquidated prematurely. Roll-over yields a payoff in period 2 of min{DA, (1− τA)VA}.
Running yields DA. We can distinguish three cases:
1. E[VA|Q1] ≥ D˜A + Φ: If all other creditors run, both roll-over and running yield
DA. If all creditors roll-over, both running and roll-over yield DA. By offering a
debt claim which pays out a tiny bit more than DA at t = 2, the bank can achieve
roll-over as the only equilibrium.
2. D˜A ≤ E[VA|Q1] < D˜A + Φ: If all other creditors run, roll-over yields zero while
running yields an expected payoff of (1−τA)E[VA−Φ|Q1]. If all creditors roll-over,
both running and roll-over yield DA. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria:
one with and one without a bank run.
3. E[VA|Q1] < D˜A: If all other creditors run, roll-over yields zero while running yields
(1 − τA)E[VA − Φ|Q1]. If all creditors roll-over, roll-over yields (1 − τA)E[VA|Q1]
while running yields DA. A bank run is the only equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2.4
The maximum project size is the sum of two independent uniform variables: θA = Θ+εA.
The common component of θA and θB has a deterministic and a random part: Θ = µ+η.
It is convenient to separate the two and consider zA ≡ θA−µ = η+ εA. The probability
density of zA is determined by the convolution of the densities of η and εA:
ϕ(zA) =
∫ ∞
−∞
υ(zA − εA)ω(εA) dεA ,
30This result implicitly uses the assumption that in the interim period banker A cannot credibly
promise to forgo some part of her claim τA[VA − Φ]. There are realizations of θA which would induce
banker A to do so if she could in order to avoid a bank run.
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where:
υ(x) =
{
1
2b
, if − b ≤ x ≤ b ,
0 , otherwise,
and ω(y) =
{
1
2a
, if − a ≤ y ≤ a ,
0 , otherwise.
I consider the case of a relatively weak common component:
(A1) a > b.
This gives us:
ϕ(zA) =

a+b+zA
4ab
, if − a− b ≤ zA ≤ b− a ,
1
2a
, if b− a < zA ≤ a− b ,
a+b−zA
4ab
, if a− b < zA ≤ a+ b ,
0 , otherwise.
If (A2) (i.e. the portfolio choice is not too low for any level of piA) and (A3) (i.e. the
portfolio choice is not too high for any level of piA) both hold, banker A’s objective can
be written as:
E [VA − 1runAΦ] = S(kA − iA) +R
[ ∫ b−a
−a−b
(µ+ zA)
a+ b+ zA
4ab
dzA
+
∫ iA−µ
b−a
(µ+ zA)
1
2a
dzA +
∫ a−b
iA−µ
iA
1
2a
dzA +
∫ a+b
a−b
iA
a+ b− zA
4ab
dzA
]
− piA Φ
[ ∫ b−a
−a−b
a+ b+ zA
4ab
dzA +
∫ 1
R
[SiA−(SkA−D˜)]−µ
b−a
1
2a
dzA
]
− (1− piA) Φ Pr
[
θA <
1
R
[SiˆA − (SkA − D˜A) ]
]
= S(kA − iA) + R
[
b
2a
(
µ+
b
3
− a
)
+
µ(iA + a− b)− µ2
2a
+
(iA − µ)2 − (a− b)2
4a
+
iA(µ+ a− b)− i2A
2a
+ iA
b
2a
]
− piA Φ
[
b
2a
+
SiA − (SkA − D˜)
2aR
− µ− a+ b
2a
]
− (1− piA) Φ Pr
[
θA <
1
R
[SiˆA − (SkA − D˜A) ]
]
.
The derivative with respect to iA reads as:
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ iA
= −S +R µ+ a− iA
2a
− piA Φ S
2aR
.
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Clearly, banker A’s objective is strictly concave in iA. The first order condition gives us
a closed-form solution for the optimal choice of iA:
i∗A = µ − a
(
2S
R
− 1
)
− piA Φ S
R2
.
Proof of Proposition 2.5
The unconditional expected net value of banker A’s portfolio is equal to:
E [VA − 1runAΦ] = E [VA | iA = i∗A] − piA Φ Pr
[
θA <
1
R
[Si∗A − (SkA − D˜A) ]
]
− (1− piA) Φ Pr
[
θA <
1
R
[SiˆA − (SkA − D˜A) ]
]
= E [VA | iA = i∗A] − Φ
[
b
2a
+
Si∗A − (SkA − D˜)
2aR
− µ− a+ b
2a
]
,
where the last equality is a direct implication of rational expectations: iˆA = i
∗
A.
1. First I evaluate the effect of piA on the gross value of banker A’s portfolio.
∂ EθA [VA | iA = i∗A]
∂ piA
=
∂ EθA [VA | iA = i∗A]
∂ iA
∂ iA
∂ piA
=
[
−S +R µ+ a− i
∗
A
2a
](
−Φ S
R2
)
.
The last equality follows from conditions (A1), (A2), and (A3).
∂ E [VA | iA = i∗A]
∂ piA
= − piA Φ2 S
2
2aR3
.
The gross value of banker A’s portfolio is reduced to the extent that banker A
takes into account the possibility of a bank run.
2. The probability of a bank run depends on transparency through her portfolio choice
i∗A:
∂ Pr[1runA = 1]
∂ piA
= −Φ S
2
2aR3
.
It follows for the expected net value of bank A’s portfolio:
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ piA
= − piA Φ2 S
2
2aR3
− Φ
(
−Φ S
2
2aR3
)
= (1− piA)Φ2 S
2
2aR3
.
Proof of Proposition 2.6
The proof proceeds in several steps.
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1. rA = rB: Assume otherwise. For instance: rA > rB. In this case, banker A
can benefit from raising τA by a little. It follows that rA 6= rB cannot hold in
equilibrium.
2. From rA = rB, it follows:
τAE [VA − 1runAΦ] = E [VA − 1runAΦ]−
kA
w − kA (1− τB)E [VB − 1runBΦ] .
The first derivative with respect to τA reads as:
∂τAE [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂τA
=
dkA
dτA
[
∂XA
∂kA
− (1− τB)
(
kA
w − kA
∂XB
∂kA
+XB
w
(w − kA)2
)]
,
where:
XA ≡ E [VA − 1runAΦ] , and: XB ≡ E [VB − 1runBΦ] .
Furthermore, since µ + a + b < kA, a marginal unit of funds is always optimally
invested in the riskless project: ∂XA
∂kA
= S. Since µ + a + b < kB, we also have:
∂XB
∂kA
= −S. From rA = rB, we can derive:
dkA
dτA
=
XA
(1− τA)S − (1− τB)
[
XB
w
(w−kA)2 − S
kA
w−kA
] 6= 0.
It follows that a first order condition for an interior choice of τA is:
S − (1− τB)
(
wXB
(w − kA)2 − S
kA
w − kA
)
= 0.
Evaluated at a value τ ∗A which satisfies this first order condition, the second deriva-
tive of banker A’s objective with respect to τA is:
∂2τAXA
∂τ 2A
= −2(1− τB)
(
dkA
dτA
)2
w
(w − kA)2
[
XB − S(w − kA)
w − kA
]
< 0.
It follows that banker A’s objective is strictly concave in τA. There is a unique
solution τ ∗A.
3. The first derivative of banker A’s objective with respect to piA is given as:
∂τAXA
∂piA
=
∂XA
∂piA
+
dkA
dpiA
dτAXA
dkA
.
If τA is chosen optimally, this becomes:
∂τAXA
∂piA
=
∂XA
∂piA
.
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By Proposition 2.5, this expression is strictly positive for all values piA < 1. The
unique solution is pi∗A = 1.
4. kA = kB: Assume that banker B sets some values τˆB and pˆiB. Now consider the
values τ ∗A and pi
∗
A which maximize banker A’s objective given τˆB and pˆiB. If τˆB = τ
∗
A
and pˆiB = pi
∗
A, then both banker A and banker B maximize their respective objec-
tive. This follows from the symmetry of the two bankers’ maximization problems.
Concavity implies that there is a unique equilibrium. It follows that the symmetric
equilibrium is the unique one. It follows: kA = kB =
w
2
.
5. Combining the symmetry of the equilibrium with banker A’s first order condition
for τA yields:
τ ∗A = τ
∗
B =
XA
w
2
− S
XA
w
2
− S
2
=
XB
w
2
− S
XB
w
2
− S
2
.
Proof of Proposition 2.7
The assumption S > R − S implies: i∗A < µ. In this case, a bank run can only occur
if at date 1 θA is revealed to be lower than µ. Conditions (A0)-(A3) continue to hold.
The unconditional expectation at date 0 of the bank’s net portfolio value is given by:
E [VA − 1runAΦ] = S(kA − iA) + R
[
b
2a
(
µ+
b
3
− a
)
+
µ(iA + a− b)− µ2
2a
+
(iA − µ)2 − (a− b)2
4a
+
iA(µ+ a− b)− i2A
2a
+ iA
b
2a
]
− piA ψΦ
[
b
2a
+
SiA − (SkA − D˜)
2aR
− µ− a+ b
2a
]
− (1− piA)ψΦ Pr
[
θA <
1
R
[SiˆA − (SkA − D˜A) ]
]
.
The derivative with respect to iA reads as:
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ iA
= −S +R µ+ a− iA
2a
− piA ψΦ S
2aR
.
This gives us a closed-form solution for the optimal choice of iA:
i∗A = µ − a
(
2S
R
− 1
)
− piA ψΦ S
R2
.
The bank’s choice of i is decreasing both in ψ and in piA. The expected net value of
bank A’s portfolio is a function of ψ and piA:
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ piA
= (1− piA)ψ2Φ2 S
2
2aR3
.
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∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ ψ
=
∂ E [VA − 1runAΦ]
∂ i∗A
∂ i∗A
∂ ψ
− Φ
[
b
2a
+
Si∗A − (SkA − D˜)
2aR
− µ− a+ b
2a
]
= (1− piA)ψΦ S
2aR
(
piAΦ
S
R2
)
− Φ
[
b
2a
+
Si∗A − (SkA − D˜)
2aR
− µ− a+ b
2a
]
= −Φ
[
b
2a
+
S
[
i∗A − (1− piA)ψpiAΦ SR2
]− (SkA − D˜)
2aR
− µ− a+ b
2a
]
.
Condition (A2) holds. In order for the derivative above to be positive, it must be true
that:
(1− piAψ)− (1− piA)piAψ < 0 .
This is never the case for piA, ψ ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that the expected net value of bank
A’s portfolio is falling in ψ.
Proof of Lemma 3.1
If iA is publicly observable, creditors observe the exact value of VA at t = 1. Lemma
2.1 applies and a bank run is the only Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if and only if
(1− τA)VA < DA.
Consider now the roll-over decision of an individual atomistic creditor if iA is not
observable. Whenever creditors are not sure that their debt claim will be fully served,
they demand a risk premium. The maximum face value which banker A can promise at
t = 1 to her creditors in case of roll-over is (1− τA)V iA(θA). Default on this claim must
occur at t = 2 if banker A was unsuccessful in screening at t = 0 and iA 6= θA. In this
case, creditors receive (1− τA)V uA (Q1). Banker A is willing to promise any risk premium
in order to avoid early liquidation.
Short-term debt claims are served sequentially. If bank A cannot fully serve all other
creditors at t = 1 (DA > (1 − τA)[VA − Φ]), roll-over by one individual agent yields
zero. This is the case if D˜A > VA − Φ, with D˜A ≡ DA1−τA .31 If creditors do not roll-over
but D˜A ≤ VA − Φ, roll-over by one individual agent yields up to (1 − τA)V iA(θA) (the
bank can always serve an individual atomistic debt claim as long as D˜A ≤ VA − Φ).
Running like everyone else yields DA (if D˜A ≤ VA − Φ) or an expected amount of
(1 − τA)[VA − Φ] (if D˜A > VA − Φ). If all other creditors choose to roll-over, projects
need not be liquidated prematurely. Roll-over yields min{DA, (1 − τA)VA}. Running
yields DA. We can distinguish six cases:
1. V iA > V
u
A > D˜A + Φ > D˜A: If all other creditors run, both roll-over and running
yield DA. If all creditors roll-over, both running and roll-over yield DA. By offering
a debt claim which pays off a tiny bit more than DA at t = 2, the bank can achieve
roll-over as the only equilibrium.
31As before, I continue to assume that banker A cannot credibly promise in the interim period to
forgo some part of her claim τA[VA − Φ].
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2. V iA > D˜A + Φ > V
u
A > D˜A: If all other creditors run, roll-over can yield at most
an expected amount p(1− τA)V iA + (1− p)× 0. Running yields pDA + (1− p)(1−
τA)[V
u
A −Φ]. An individual creditor prefers to roll-over in this situation if and only
if V iA > D˜A +
1−p
p
[V uA − Φ]. If all creditors roll-over, both roll-over and running
yield DA. Roll-over is a Nash equilibrium.
3. V iA > D˜A + Φ > D˜A > V
u
A : If all other creditors run, roll-over can yield at most
an expected amount p(1− τA)V iA + (1− p)× 0. Running yields pDA + (1− p)(1−
τA)[V
u
A − Φ]. An individual creditor prefers to roll-over in this situation if and
only if V iA > D˜A +
1−p
p
[V uA − Φ]. If all creditors roll-over, running yields DA while
roll-over yields up to p(1 − τA)V iA + (1 − p)(1 − τA)V uA . The bank needs to offer
a risk premium to compensate creditors for the risk that iA 6= θA and VA = V uA .
Roll-over is a Nash equilibrium if and only if E[VA|Q1] > D˜A.
4. D˜A + Φ > V
i
A > V
u
A > D˜A: If all other creditors run, roll-over yields 0. Running
like the others yields an expected payoff of (1− τA)[E[VA|Q1]−Φ]. A bank run is
an equilibrium. If all creditors roll-over, both roll-over and running yield DA. By
offering a debt claim which pays off a tiny bit more than DA at t = 2, the bank
can achieve roll-over as a Nash equilibrium.
5. D˜A + Φ > V
i
A > D˜A > V
u
A : If all other creditors run, roll-over yields 0. Running
like the others yields an expected payoff of (1 − τA)[E[VA|Q1] − Φ]. A bank run
is an equilibrium. If all creditors roll-over, running yields DA while roll-over can
yield at most an expected amount (1 − τA)E[VA|Q1]. The bank needs to offer a
risk premium to compensate creditors for the risk that iA 6= θA and VA = V uA .
Roll-over is a Nash equilibrium if and only if E[VA|Q1] > D˜A.
6. D˜A + Φ > D˜A > V
i
A > V
u
A : If all other creditors run, roll-over yields 0. Running
like the others yields an expected payoff of (1−τA)[E[VA|Q1]−Φ]. A bank run is an
equilibrium. If all creditors roll-over, running yields DA while roll-over can yield at
most an expected amount (1−τA)E[VA|Q1]. We know that (1−τA)E[VA|Q1] < DA.
No risk premium offered is high enough to avoid a bank run. A bank run is the
only equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
The observation of θB is informative with respect to the common component Θ. Banker
A optimally updates her belief about Θ using Bayes’ rule:
Θ|θB ∼ U ( max{µ− b , θB − a } , min{µ+ b , θB + a } ) .
I continue to study the case of a relatively weak common component: (A1) a > b. This
implies that even conditional on observing θB, banker A’s posterior of Θ will at times
be identical to her prior. Only extreme observations of θB change her posterior.
µˆ = E[θA|θB] = E[Θ|θB] = 1
2
max{µ− b , θB − a } + 1
2
min{µ+ b , θB + a } .
40
In addition to µˆ, we also define:
bˆ ≡ 1
2
min{µ+ b , θB + a } − 1
2
max{µ− b , θB − a } .
Now the problems with and without knowledge of θB are identical up to the two param-
eters µ and b, or µˆ and bˆ, respectively. It is straightforward to show that:
b ≥ bˆ , and µ+ b ≥ µˆ+ bˆ .
Together, these two inequalities imply that conditions (A1)-(A3) are sufficient conditions
for:
(a1) a > bˆ ,
(a2) µˆ− a+ bˆ < 1
R
[
S
(
µˆ− a
(
2S
R
− 1
)
− Φ S
R2
)
− (SkA − D˜A)
]
, and
(a3) µˆ− a
(
2S
R
− 1
)
< µˆ+ a− bˆ .
Proof of Lemma 3.3
There are three possible situations for banker A’s portfolio choice: (1.) screening by
banker A is successful, (2.) screening by banker A fails, but screening by banker B
is successful and iB is observable, (3.) neither θA nor θB is known. Ex-ante, before
screening takes place, the unconditional expected net value of banker A’s portfolio is
equal to:
E [VA − 1runAΦ] =
p
[
E [VA | iA = θA] − (1− piA) [ ppiB Φ Pru(i∗∗A ) + (1− ppiB) Φ Pru(i∗A) ]
]
+ (1− p) ppiB
[
E [VA | iA = i∗∗A ] − piA Φ Pro(i∗∗A ) − (1− piA) Φ Pru(i∗∗A )
]
+ (1− p) (1− ppiB)
[
E [VA | iA = i∗A] − piA Φ Pro(i∗A) − (1− piA) Φ Pru(i∗A)
]
.
Even if screening was successful, a bank run may occur if iA is unobservable, θA is low,
and creditors put a low probability weight on the event that screening was a success. If
iB is observable and banker B has screened successfully, creditors know that banker A
had the option to react to the observation of θB. In this case, the probability of a bank
run is given by:
Pru(i
∗∗
A ) = Pr
{
p
[
SkA + (R−S) θA
]
+ (1−p) [S (kA− i∗∗A ) +R min { i∗∗A , θA } ] < D˜A} .
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If iB is not observable or banker B has failed at screening her risky project, creditors
know that banker A did not have the option to react to the observation of θB. In this
case, the unconditional probability of a bank run is given by:
Pru(i
∗
A) = Pr
{
p
[
SkA + (R−S) θA
]
+ (1−p) [S (kA− i∗A) +R min { i∗A , θA } ] < D˜A} .
These expressions are derived under the assumption that creditors have rational expec-
tations about iA.
1. First I evaluate the effect of piA on the gross value of bankerA’s portfolio if screening
has failed. Her portfolio choice x depends on the observability of θB.
∂ EθA [VA | iA = x]
∂ piA
=
∂ EθA [VA | iA = x]
∂ x
∂ x
∂ piA
=
[
−S +R µ+ a− x
2a
](
−Φ S
R2
)
.
The last equality follows from conditions (A1),(A2), and (A3). If θB is unknown
to banker A, x = i∗A and the derivative above is deterministic. If banker A knows
θB, her portfolio choice x = i
∗∗
A is a function of the random variable θB. We know
that i∗A = E[i∗∗A ]. This gives:
∂ E [VA | iA = i∗A]
∂ piA
=
∂ E [VA | iA = i∗∗A ]
∂ piA
= − piA Φ
2 S2
2aR3
.
The gross value of banker A’s portfolio is reduced to the extent that banker A
takes into account the possibility of a bank run.
2. I continue to consider the case that screening by banker A has failed. If banker
A’s portfolio choice is public information, the probability of a bank run depends
on her portfolio choice x:
Pro(x) = Pr
[
θA <
1
R
[Sx− (SkA − D˜A)]
]
=
b
2a
+
SE[x]− (SkA − D˜A)
2aR
− µ− a+ b
2a
.
The second equality follows from conditions (A1),(A2), and (A3). We know that
E[i∗∗A ] = i∗A, which allows us to conclude:
Pro(i
∗
A) = Pro(i
∗∗
A ) =
1
2
− 1
2aR
[
µ(R− S) + a
(
2S2
R
− S
)
+ piAΦ
S2
R2
+ SkA − D˜A
]
.
The observation of θB does not decrease the unconditional probability of a bank
run because it does not reduce the uncertainty stemming from εA. If conditions
(A1), (A2), and (A3) hold, this is the only risk which matters for banker A’s
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portfolio choice at the margin. It follows that:
∂ Pro(i
∗
A)
∂ piA
=
∂ Pro(i
∗∗
A )
∂ piA
= −Φ S
2
2aR3
.
3. If banker A’s portfolio choice remains hidden, the probability of a bank run depends
on creditors’ expectation of her portfolio choice in case screening has failed:
Pru(x) = Pr
[
θA <
1
R− pS [(1− p)Sx− (SkA − D˜A)]
]
=
b
2a
+
(1− p)SE[x]− (SkA − D˜A)
2a(R− pS) −
µ− a+ b
2a
.
The second equality uses conditions (A1), (A2’), and (A3). From E[i∗∗A ] = i∗A, it
follows:
Pru(i
∗
A) = Pru(i
∗∗
A ) =
1
2
− 1
2a(R− pS)
[
µ(R− S) + (1− p)a
(
2S2
R
− S
)
+ (1− p)piAΦS
2
R2
+ SkA − D˜A
]
.
Accordingly:
∂ Pru(i
∗
A)
∂ piA
= − 1
2a
1− p
R− pS Φ
S2
R2
.
Proof of Lemma 3.5
For p = 0, we are back in the case considered in Section 2.3. ∆(piA) > 0 for any value
piA ∈ [0, 1):
∆(piA) = (1− piA) Φ2 S
2aR3
> 0 .
Furthermore, the function ∆(piA) is continuous in p and in piA.
Proof of Lemma 3.6
In general, given a portfolio choice iA independent of εA, taking the expectation of banker
A’s portfolio value with respect to εA gives:
EεA [VA] = Sk + iA(R− S)−
R
4a
(µ+ η − a− iA)2.
Define e ≡ E [Θ|QA0 ]−µ−η as the forecast error of banker A in estimating Θ conditional
on her end-of-period-0 information set QA0 :
µ+ η − a− iA = −e− 2aR− S
R
+ piAΦ
S
R2
.
43
It follows for the expected value of banker A’s portfolio:
E [VA] = Sk + i∗A(R− S)−
R
4a
[
E
[
e2
]
+
[
2a
R− S
R
− piAΦ S
R2
]2]
.
This is true no matter how many portfolio choices of rivals banker A observes. The only
element which depends on the number of signals observed is the error variance E[e2]. It
follows:
E [VA | iA = i∗∗A ] − E [VA | iA = i∗A] =
R
4a
E
([
E [Θ|∅]−Θ
]2
−
[
E [Θ|θB]−Θ
]2)
.
The width of the support of banker A’s belief about the position of Θ decides on the
error variance. If banker A does not observe θB, we know that:[
E [Θ|∅]−Θ
]2
=
(2b)2
12
=
b2
3
.
If banker A observes θB, her posterior about Θ depends on the realization of θB. Let
M denote the width of the support of banker A’s posterior for Θ. The probability
distribution of the random variable M is:
ϕ(M) =
{
M
2ab
, if 0 < M < 2b ,
a−b
a
, if M = 2b .
It follows:[
E [Θ|θB]−Θ
]2
=
a− b
a
× (2b)
2
12
+
∫ 2b
0
M
2ab
× (M)
2
12
dM =
b2
3
− b
3
6a
.
Proof of Proposition 3.7
The proof follows along the lines of the proof to Proposition 2.6. The only difference
is in Step (3.) which demonstrates that there is a unique solution for pi∗A. To see that,
consider the first derivative of banker A’s objective with respect to piA:
∂τAXA
∂piA
=
∂XA
∂piA
− (1− τB) kA
w − kA
∂XB
∂piA
+
dkA
dpiA
dτAXA
dkA
.
If τA is chosen optimally, this becomes:
∂τAXA
∂piA
=
∂XA
∂piA
− (1− τB) kA
w − kA
∂XB
∂piA
.
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The second derivative with respect to piA is:
∂2τAXA
∂pi2A
=
∂2XA
∂pi2A
− (1− τB) kA
w − kA
∂2XB
∂pi2A
+
dkA
dpiA
d
dkA
[
∂τAXA
∂piA
]
.
We know that:
d
dkA
[
∂τAXA
∂piA
]
=
d
dpiA
[
∂τAXA
∂kA
]
.
In equilibrium τA (and therefore kA) is chosen optimally and the term above is equal to
zero. Furthermore, we know from the analysis above that the value of a bank is concave
in transparency: ∂
2XA
∂pi2A
< 0. We also know that the value of the rival bank is linear in
piA :
∂2XB
∂pi2A
= 0. It follows that banker A’s objective is strictly concave in piA. There is a
unique solution pi∗A.
Proof of Proposition 3.10
The proof follows along the lines of the proof to Proposition 2.6. Step (3.) is as in the
proof to Proposition 3.7. The only innovation with respect to the previous two proofs
in in step (2.) which demonstrates that there is a unique solution for τ ∗A, and in step
(5.) which pins down τ ∗A. Consider the expected payoff of banker A used in the proof to
Proposition 2.6. From rA = rB, it follows:
τAE [VA − 1runAΦ] = E [VA − 1runAΦ]−
kA
w−kA
N−1
(1− τB)E [VB − 1runBΦ] .
The first order condition of banker A for an optimal choice of τA becomes:
S − (1− τB)
(
(N − 1) wXB
(w − kA)2 − S
kA
w − kA
)
= 0.
Proceeding to step (5.), we use symmetry: kA =
w−kA
N−1 =
w
N
. Banker A’s first order
condition for an optimal choice of τA becomes:
S − (1− τB)
(
N
N − 1
XB
kA
− S
N − 1
)
= 0.
It follows:
τ ∗A =
ρ− S
ρ− S
N
, with: ρ =
E [VA − 1runAΦ]
kA
.
Proof of Lemma 3.11
Consider the difference of these two terms. With probability 1−ppi∗N , having j+1 instead
of j banks does not matter for banker B’s information set QB0 because the additional
banker fails at screening or her portfolio choice is not public information. The difference
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of the two terms is zero in this case. With probability ppi∗N , the value of θN is revealed
and the information set QB0 contains one more element because of the additional bank.
The difference of the two terms is non-negative in this case. On expectation, it is equal
to:
∂ E [VB − 1runBΦ]
∂ pi∗A
∣∣∣∣
N=j
− ∂ E [VB − 1runBΦ]
∂ pi∗A
∣∣∣∣
N=j+1
=ppi∗N(1− p) p
R
4a
N−2∑
j=0
(
N − 2
j
)
(1− pi∗Np)N−2−j(pi∗Np)j[
E
[
e(j)2
]− E [e(j + 1)2]− (E [e(j + 1)2]− E [e(j + 2)2]) ].
What exactly is the value of: E [e(j)2]− E [e(j + 1)2]? By defining 2mj as the width of
the banker’s posterior for Θ after observing j realizations of θl, we can write:
E
[
e(j)2
]− E [e(j + 1)2] = E[(2mj)2
12
− (2mj+1)
2
12
]
=
1
3
E
[
m2j −m2j+1
]
.
Unfortunately, we cannot derive a tractable expression for E[m2j ]. Therefore, we must
take the value of mj as given here. Conditional on some number mj ≤ b, what is the
distribution of mj+1? We know about M ≡ 2mj+1:
ϕ(M) =
{
M
2amj
, if 0 < M < 2mj ,
a−mj
a
, if M = 2mj .
It follows:
E
[
m2j+1
]
=
1
4
E
[
M2
]
=
1
4
[
a−mj
a
(2mj)
2 +
∫ 2mj
0
M
2amj
M2dM
]
= m2j −
m3j
2a
.
The expected reduction of the error variance becomes:
E
[
e(j)2
]− E [e(j + 1)2] = 1
3
[
m2j −m2j +
m3j
2a
]
=
m3j
6a
.
What about the corresponding expression after one more observation? To answer this
question, we need to know the probability distribution of M ′ = 2mj+2:
ϕ(M ′ = y) =
∫ 2mj
y
ϕ(M = x)ϕ(M ′ = y|M = x)dM.
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It is straightforward to see that:
ϕ(M ′ = 2mj) =
(
a−mj
a
)2
.
For all realizations of M ′ with 0 ≤M ′ < 2mj, we calculate:
ϕ(M ′ = y) =
a−mj
a
× y
2amj
+
y
2amj
× a−
y
2
a
+
∫ 2mj
y
M
2amj
y
aM
dM
=
2ay +mjy − 32y2
2a2mj
.
It follows:
E
[
m2j+2
]
=
1
4
E
[
M ′2
]
=
1
4
[(
a−mj
a
)2
(2mj)
2 +
∫ 2mj
0
2ay +mjy − 32y2
2a2mj
y2dy
]
=m2j −
m3j
a
+
3
10
m4j
a2
.
The expected reduction of the error variance becomes:
E
[
e(j + 1)2
]− E [e(j + 2)2] = 1
3
[
m2j+1 −m2j+2
]
=
m3j
6a
(
1− 3mj
5a
)
.
Finally it follows:
E
[
e(j)2
]− E [e(j + 1)2]− (E [e(j + 1)2]− E [e(j + 2)2]) = 1
10
m4j
a2
.
On expectation, this term is positive for any finite number N .
Proof of Proposition 3.12
Consider the equilibrium allocation described by Proposition 3.10 for the case of N
banks. Denote τ ∗A(N) as the corresponding equilibrium price and define the fall in this
price caused by adding one bank as: ∆τ ≡ τ ∗A(N)− τ ∗A(N + 1). Similarly, we define the
size of the information externality as a function of N :
B(N) ≡ (1− p) p R
4a
N−2∑
j=0
(
N − 2
j
)
(1− pi∗Np)N−2−j(pi∗Np)j
[
E
[
e(j)2
]− E [e(j + 1)2] ],
and ∆B ≡ B(N)−B(N + 1) as the fall in the size of the information externality caused
by adding one additional bank. The equilibrium level of transparency for the case of N
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banks is smaller than for the case of N + 1 banks if and only if:
[1− τ ∗A(N)]B(N) > [1− τ ∗A(N + 1)]B(N + 1)
⇔[1− τ ∗A(N)]B(N) > [1− τ ∗A(N) + ∆τ ] [B(N)−∆B]
⇔[1− τ ∗A(N)]∆B > ∆τ [B(N)−∆B].
From Proposition 3.10 we know that:
τ ∗A(N) =
ρ− S
ρ− S
N
and: ∆τ =
ρ− S
(Nρ− S)[ρ(N + 1)− S] .
If R is sufficiently close to S, ρ is close to S and ∆τ close to zero for all values of
N . Furthermore, we know from Lemma 3.11 that ∆B is strictly positive for any finite
number N .
The probability of a run on bank A is convex in piA. For any number N , we know
from Corollary 3.9 that this probability is falling in response to a marginal increase in
piA from its equilibrium level (if pi
∗
A > 0).
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Subtracting the left hand side of the first order condition for pi∗A in Proposition 3.7 from
the first order condition for piSBA yields:
(1− p) p Rb
3
24a2
+ (1− τ ∗B) (1− p) p
Rb3
24a2
.
If R is close to S, τ ∗B is close to zero for all parameter values. In this case, the term
above is monotonically increasing in b and R, and falling in a.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
If R is close to S, τ ∗B is close to zero for all values of piA. The left hand side of the first
order conditions for pi∗A and for pi
SB
A is (almost) linear in piA in this case. Define pi
MAX
A
as the value of piA which maximizes the expected net value of banker A’s portfolio. If R
is sufficiently close to S, then we have:
piMAXA ≈
1
2
[pi∗A + pi
SB
A ] .
The probability of a bank run is convex in piA. The value pi
MAX
A is the equilibrium choice
for N = ∞. We know from Corollary 3.9 that the probability of a bank run is falling
at piMAXA (if pi
MAX
A > 0). The second derivative of the probability of a bank run with
respect to piA is constant. It follows that the probability of a bank run is lower for pi
SB
A
than for pi∗A.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3
Creditors take into account the possibility that screening by bank A was successful. If
θA ≥ θ and the policy maker does not reveal iA, creditors roll-over. The policy maker
strictly prefers not to disclose iA in this case, because disclosure might reveal that bank
A had failed at screening which would trigger a run. The policy maker’s decision not
to disclose does not reveal anything about iA because the policy maker does not know
iA. If θA < θ and the policy maker does not reveal iA, creditors choose to run on bank
A. The policy maker strictly prefers to disclose now, because a run is avoided if bank A
had been successful at screening and iA = θA. This happens with probability p.
Proof of Proposition 4.4
There are two types of policy makers. They differ with respect to what they know about
iA. Type 1 knows that bank A has screened successfully: iA = θA. In case that creditors
roll-over even if they do not observe iA, the policy maker is indifferent whether to disclose
this information. If creditors run if they do not observe iA, disclosure is strictly better.
Type 2 knows that bank A has failed at screening: iA 6= θA. In case that creditors
roll-over even if they do not observe iA, the policy maker strictly prefers no-disclosure.
If creditors run if they do not observe iA, she is indifferent.
1. Partial Revelation Equilibrium: Both type 1 and type 2 policy makers play dis-
closure in case no-disclosure triggers a run (θA < θ), and no-disclosure in case
no-disclosure implies roll-over (θA > θ). Since both types play the same strategy,
creditors cannot infer anything about iA from the policy maker’s action. Partial
revelation is an equilibrium just as in the case of an uninformed policy maker.
2. Full Revelation Equilibrium: Type 1 always plays disclosure irrespective of θA,
while type 2 always plays no-disclosure. Creditors respond by running whenever
iA is not disclosed. They roll-over whenever iA is disclosed and iA = θA. Full
revelation is an equilibrium.
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